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Abstract 
 
The “Marginal Revolution,” a well-known event in the history of economic 
thought, challenged the mainstream classical political economy and introduced new 
methods to economic study. The “Marginal Revolution” marked the rise of the Marginal 
Utility School and pushed the formulation of neoclassical economics. Because marginal 
utility is the core concept of the “Marginal Revolution,” this thesis studies the origin of 
marginal utility theory by examining figures such as Bernoulli, Bentham, Dupuit, and 
Goseen, and the utility theory with its related topics of Jevons, Menger and Walras in the 
1870s. This thesis considers the significance of the “Marginal Revolution,” with 
particular focus on whether this event can be considered revolutionary. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
In this chapter, I present the general introduction of the whole thesis and introduce 
several concepts that are related to the “Marginal Revolution” and the marginal utility 
theory in the history of economic thought, before examining the representative figures 
and their theory. The first part is a general introduction of this thesis, about its main 
contents, motivation and research range. The second part is about some basic concepts in 
this thesis, before the examination on the main contents; marginalism is a doctrine 
generated from the “Marginal Revolution” and continues to the present economics 
academy; utility is the central and fundamental concept for the marginal utility theory, 
and the two important properties of utility, the subjective feature and the quantitative 
feature, are introduced; the “Marginal Revolution” in the 1870s and its significance is 
introduced from a common point of view. In addition, I show the direct purpose and the 
structure of the whole thesis in the last part. 
1.1. General Introduction of the Thesis 
This thesis is about the “Marginal Revolution” and the marginal utility theory 
before and in the 1870s. In the history of economic thought, the “Marginal Revolution” is 
usually considered as a revolutionary event, since it established a subjective utility theory 
of value and adopted the marginal approach as an effective analytical tool for economics. 
2 
The “Marginal Revolution” marked the rise of the Marginal Utility School1 in the 1870s 
and probably the start of modern neoclassical economics. However, I have some doubts 
about this idea, and through the examination of the “Marginal Revolution” in terms with 
its central theory and the most representative achievement, the marginal utility theory, I 
will discuss some factors that may be opposed to the idea that the “Marginal Revolution” 
is a revolutionary event in the history of economic thought. By doing this, we will have a 
better understanding of what the “Marginal Revolution” was, what influence of this 
process had on the later development of economics, the origin of the “Marginal 
Revolution” and its direct connection with and the difference from the modern 
neoclassical economics2. 
Rethinking the “Marginal Revolution” and the marginal utility theory is of value 
not only for me but also for the other readers. For myself, this study helps me to 
understand the origin of the classic marginal utility theory, including utility theory of 
value and marginal analysis, which are the fundamental elements of marginalism and 
modern neoclassical economics. Through this study, I will have a general scope on many 
topics based on the utility theory, gradually find what specific topics interest me the most 
and narrow my future research range. Also, trying to understand utility, a fundamental 
concept, from its origin will help me think about the related fields from an original 
perspective. For the other readers, helping people recall and reconsider the “Marginal 
                                                 
1 The representative pioneers of the Marginal Utility School in the 1870s are William Stanley Jevons, Carl Menger and 
Léon Walras and their works are considered as the most important achievement of the “Marginal Revolution”, which is 
introduced in Part 1.2.3 and examined in the whole of Chapter 3. 
 
2 Some people may think that the “Marginal Revolution” or the rise of the Marginal Utility School in the 1870s is the 
start of modern neoclassical economics, but I disagree with this idea. This thesis presents a few general differences 
between them and discuss the less significance of the “Marginal Revolution” compared with Marshall’s Principles, in 
Part 4.2. However, because this thesis does not focus on Marshall but only the Marginal Utility School in the 1870s, the 
contrast is not detailed. 
3 
Revolution” and the classic marginal utility theory is the direct motivation, by presenting 
the representative figures, their original theory and their influence. Furthermore, I write 
this thesis about the three pioneers, Jevons, Menger and Walras, with their predecessors, 
in order to show some of their disputable merits3 and deficiencies4, which is for what 
George J. Stigler concluded that one of the purposes to study the history of economic 
thought: 
Or one may, and most often does, simply set forth the major steps in the 
development of a branch of economic theory, hoping that it can be justified by its 
contribution to the understanding of modern economics. (Stigler, 1950, p. 307) 
 
Though the discussion of the marginal utility theory is related to many topics in 
economics, including its later development, its relation with the classical economics and 
its specific implication and application, due to the limitation of my study, the research 
range of this thesis should be mentioned. The first range is about time. As the title says, 
this thesis is about the “Marginal Revolution” and the marginal utility theory before and 
in the 1870s only. Specifically, the examination on the representative figures is from the 
18th century to the 1870s. The utility theory of Jevons, Menger and Walras occupies the 
main part of this thesis, and the utility theory before the three pioneers in the 18th and 19th 
centuries serves as the origin of the utility theory of the three pioneers and holds the 
second part. Hence, this thesis does not cover the utility theory and its related topics after 
the 1870s. Even though the development of the marginal utility theory experienced a long 
period, this thesis stops the discussion at its peak, namely the rise of the Marginal Utility 
                                                 
3 For example, the three pioneers systematically established and adopted a theory of subjective economic value, 
developed a new analytical tool, the marginal approach, and challenged the dominance of the classical political 
economy making economics lively at their time. 
 
4 For example, the three pioneers probably repudiated the classical theory intensively and ignored some of its cogent 
contents, made many basic models in their theory hard to fit the reality, and overestimated the importance of 
quantitative analysis and mathematics for economics. 
4 
School in the 1870s. Hence, the consideration of the later development of the marginal 
utility theory and neoclassical economics is not included, but with the limited 
examination of Marshall’s work and my assumption, this thesis presents a few 
differences between the Marginal Utility School and general neoclassical economics, in 
the part of discussion, but does not further discuss the marginal utility theory after the 
1870s in detail. The second range is about classical economics. In the history of 
economic thought, the classical political economy was a prevailing and even dominant 
stream at the years of the rise of the Marginal Utility School. So the presentation on the 
connection between the two streams was inevitable while I examine the marginal utility 
theory at that time. However, since this thesis is only about the marginal utility theory, I 
do not cover the works of the classical economics but only present some general 
connections between the two streams and the attitudes of the Marginal Utility School 
towards the classical theory. The third range is about the depth of the study. Because 
utility theory is a fundamental economic value theory, there are many specific topics (its 
implication and application) based on the utility theory, such as the exchange theory, the 
continuous variation, the measurement of utility and the demand function. Every specific 
topic based on the fundamental utility theory can be extended as a research topic, but 
thesis is only an examination of the marginal utility theory and a brief presentation of 
these related topics. Hence, the relevant specific topics are not furthered discussed in this 
thesis. 
1.2. Basic Concepts 
1.2.1. Marginalism 
5 
The word “margin” was created in the late 16th century, from the Medieval Latin 
“marginalis.” The word “marginalism” was probably first formally created and used by 
John Atkinson Hobson, in his Work and wealth (1904), because he needed an expression 
to cover the terms “marginal utility” and “marginal productivity,” which economists at 
his time had widely accepted (Howey, 1989, p. xiii). The term first appeared when he 
wrote that “this slightly technical disquisition is rendered necessary by the wide 
acceptance which ‘marginalism’ has won in academic circles” (Hobson, 2010, p. 110). 
Hobson used the word seven times in Work and wealth, in a disparaging tone, because he 
found fault with the concept and its unwelcome policy application (Howey, 1989, p. xiii). 
However, the word “marginalism” was not frequently used until twenty-five years after 
Hobson’s first coinage. The widespread employment of marginal cost, marginal revenue, 
marginal rate of substitution, and marginal propensity to consume during the 1930s drove 
Richard Allen Lester to complain in 1946 that the “minutiae of marginalism” were 
consuming one-half to one-third of the leading American textbooks, and this complaint 
reintroduced the term “marginalism,” once again as a disparaging word (Howey, 1989, p. 
xiv). The word “marginalism” first entered a general dictionary in English in 1966, when 
Webster’s Third defined “marginalism” as “economic analysis that stresses the use of 
marginal qualities in the determination of equilibrium” (Howey, 1989, p. xiv). 
Though economic analysis has adopted plenty of marginal properties, economists 
generally accept that the history of marginalism began with the emerging of a property 
that is now called “marginal utility.” Even though some people, like Jules Dupuit in 1844 
and Hermann Heinrich Gossen in 1854, showed some enlightenment about marginal 
utility in their works, “according to the conventional accounts, marginal utility, in a form 
6 
later acceptable to economists, was first successfully and independently created during 
the twelve years from 1862 to 1874 by William Stanley Jevons, Carl Menger, and Léon 
Walras” (Howey, 1989, pp. xiv–xv). Jevons, Menger and Walras wrote their books at the 
right moment (Kauder, 1965, p. 66); these three economists are regarded as the pioneers 
of marginalism. 
1.2.2. Utility 
Utility as a concept of marginalism represents a consumer’s satisfaction with a 
good. A good satisfies human wants and has utility. In general, there are two main 
features of utility. First, utility is a subjective valuation of economic value. Different from 
classical economics, in which economic objective production cost (from the supply side) 
determines value, utility can be another determinant of value (from the demand side). 
Though utility is not a purely subjective concept in philosophy, compared with 
production cost, utility differs for each individual and thus tends to be subjective. 
Because utility is a subjective valuation, how utility can be measured and whether it can 
be interpersonally compared are worthwhile topics of economic study.  
The second main feature of utility is that utility is more a quantity than a quality, 
different from usefulness and use-value in classical economics. With the introduction of 
utility as a new valuation, some tools and concepts from mathematics and other natural 
sciences, such as differentials, analytical geometry, and behavioral science, gradually 
entered the political economy, giving economics more scientific features. Under a series 
of fundamental assumptions, utility, like production cost, was quantified. Utility could be 
calculated and certified by mathematical tools, so utility theory gradually matured with 
neoclassical economics. Due to the need to simplify its definition and application, utility 
7 
has become a one-dimensional quantitative concept. Though this simplification makes 
the understanding of economic value direct, it also makes utility an abstract concept, 
ignores possible real-world factors and has influenced economic analysis so far. This 
phenomenon may reflect a controversy between the fact that people want to easily 
understand the real world and the true difficulty in knowing the real world. Some 
economists are trying to find an easy way to know the truth, but that way may omit some 
necessary facts and lead to misunderstandings. 
1.2.3. “Marginal Revolution” 
A revolution, from Latin “revolutio,” meaning “a turn around,” is “a sudden, 
radical, or complete change” (Merriam Webster Online). The definition indicates two 
parts of the meaning of a revolution, namely generating a fundamental change and taking 
place in a short period. Besides, a revolution can occur not only in the economy and in 
socio-political institutions but also in people’s thoughts. 
Beginning in the 1870s, economists began to formally accept marginal utility 
theory, on account of the work of three economists. Jevons in England, Menger in 
Austria, and Walras in Switzerland, independently produced a similar economic theory 
based on subjective utility. This period marked a turning point in the history of economic 
thought: the analysis of production and exchange was not only the task of social theory 
but also more scientific methods. Compared with classical economics, which asked about 
“the true basis of value, activities that contributed to national wealth, systems of rights, or 
about the forms of government under which people grow rich” (Unger, 187, pp. 120–122), 
marginalism, as a means “to escape the conundrums of value theory and to answer how,” 
was established with the aim “to withdraw economics from debates about how society 
8 
worked and what kind of society we wanted to live in, and escalate it to an objective and 
universal realm” (Unger, 2007, pp. 55–64). This thesis will consider whether this process 
was truly revolutionary or whether it was only a kind of “ideology,” but usually, 
economists and sociologists consider the 1870s the years of the “Marginal Revolution.” 
1.3. Purposes of the Thesis 
The purpose of this thesis, by studying two things, “origins of the revolution (if 
revolution it was)” and “its eventual triumph” (Blaug, 1972, p. 270), in terms of the 
development of the marginal utility theory before and in the 1870s, is to consider whether 
the “Marginal Revolution” can be called a revolution and how revolutionary this process 
is, in the history of economic thought, from its period and significance. If it can be 
regarded as a revolution, was this event historically inevitable, and what influence did it 
have on the later economic academia and society? If the “Marginal Revolution” is not a 
real revolution, did something happen to make the event seem revolutionary, or did it 
mislead later economic analysis in some aspects? For utility is the fundamental and 
central concept of marginalism and then neoclassical economics, with the help of a few 
secondary references, I focus on utility theory and study its relevant topics. In Chapter 2, 
the origin of the “Marginal Revolution”, I choose Bernoulli, Bentham, Dupuit, and 
Gossen as representative figures who made significant contributions to formation of 
marginalism. In Chapter 3, the “Marginal Revolution”, I examine the primary works of 
the three pioneers, Jevons, Menger and Walras. Also, I will present my discussion in 
Chapter 4.
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Chapter Two: Utility Theory of the Representatives before the 1870s 
“But I have planted the tree of utility. I have planted it deep, and spread it wide.” 
— Jeremy Bentham (Bentham & Bowring, 1843, p. 588) 
Before the 1870s, while the three pioneers of the Marginal Utility School, Jevons, 
Menger and Walras, published their representative work about the marginal utility theory, 
there were many writers having worked on this fresh topic. Some of them might have 
vague but original ideas about either the method or the thought of the utility theory, and 
some of them developed the utility theory and laid a foundation for the three pioneers in 
the 1870s. In this chapter, I chronologically examine some representative writers with 
their utility theory before the 1870s and analysis their influence, the figures including 
some early writers, Bernoulli, Bentham, Dupuit and Gossen. 
2.1. Early Writers 
The earliest reference to the notion of diminishing marginal utility can probably 
be found in Aristotle’s Politics: “External goods have a limit, like any other instrument, 
and all things useful are of such a nature that where there is too much of them they must 
either do harm, or at any rate be of no use” (Aristotle, 1323, Book Seven, Part I). Though 
we can not deduce whether this “useful” property is an intrinsic or extrinsic property, it 
revealed the negative correlation between the quantity of goods and this “useful” property 
to people, as the law of diminishing marginal utility. But several writers have disagreed 
 10 
that Aristotle had marginal considerations in his value theory (Gordon, 1964; Kauder, 
1953, pp. 638–650; Meikle, 1997; Schumpeter, 1995; Soudek, 1952, pp. 45–75). 
The discussion of the determination of economic value was the beginning of 
utility theory. Classical political economy held that value was explained mainly by 
production cost, but there were several people who protested this explanation before the 
nineteenth century. In the eighteenth century, Italian mercantilists such as Antonio 
Genovesi, Giammaria Ortes, Pietro Verri, Cesare Beccaria, and Giovanni Rinaldo had 
significant utilitarian considerations in their proposals of economic policy (Pribram, 1983, 
pp. 86–88). Abbé Ferdinando Galiani, a pupil of Genovesi, in his Della moneta in 1751, 
wrote that value was explained quantitatively by a ratio of utility and scarcity, and value 
was formed by human minds; Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, in his Réflexions sur la 
formation et la distribution de richesse in 1769, thought that value was derived from the 
general utility of the class to which the good belonged, by comparing present and future 
wants and expected difficulties in procurement; Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, in his De 
commerce et le gouvernement in 1776, emphasized that value was not only determined by 
cost but also explained by utility (Pribram, 1983, pp. 115–120). Even though these 
writers did not form a complete theory of utility-determined value, and the implication of 
utility in their works was probably not the same as the later works of marginalism and 
neoclassical economics, they indeed provided new angles for later economists to question 
the classical cost-determined value theory. 
2.2. Bernoulli 
2.2.1. Calculus Applied in Economics 
 11 
Isaac Newton and Gottfried Leibniz initially developed modern calculus, 
independently of each other, in the seventeenth century, and then, during the eighteenth 
century, many attempts were made to apply this method in different fields, including 
economics (Bower, 1939; Brunschvicg, 1912, p. 243ff). Several later writers defined 
marginal utility mathematically as follows. Let u(q) be the utility of goods at the quantity 
q, and then u(q + △q) – u(q) is the increase in utility (from u(q) to u(q + △q)) 
corresponding to the increase in quantity (from q to q + △q). Marginal utility is the limit 
of the ratio when △q tends to zero (Cassirer, 1953, p. 15–111; Jevons, 2012, pp. 58–61; 
Kells, 1943). 
q
q)(u-)qq(ulim UtilityMarginal
0q 


 
After the application of calculus, mathematical tools started playing an important 
role in economic analysis. 
2.2.2. Bernoulli’s Discovery 
Among the many writers talking about utility in the eighteenth century was Daniel 
Bernoulli. Bernoulli first unambiguously discovered marginal utility in his Exposition of 
a new theory on the measurement of risk in 1738 (Kauder, 1965, p. 32). As a member of a 
family of famous mathematicians, Bernoulli skillfully applied calculus to several 
economic problems. Bernoulli considered that value was not determined by price, but by 
utility and income:  
To do this, the determination of the value of an item must not be based on its price, 
but rather on the utility it yields… The utility, however, is dependent on the 
particular circumstances of the person making the estimate. (Bernoulli, 1954, p. 
24) 
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Further, “[a]ny increase in wealth, no matter how insignificant, will always result in an 
increase in utility which is inversely proportionate to the quantity of goods already 
possessed” (Bernoulli, 1954, p. 25). Here Bernoulli substituted scarcity with individual 
income (Kauder, 1965, p. 32). 
Bernoulli recognized that the law of diminishing utility was not “a theoretical law 
gained by reasoning” but “the offshoot of empirical observation,” which was “a rule with 
exceptions” (Kauder, 1965, p. 32). For example, 
A rich prisoner who possesses two thousand ducats but needs two thousand ducats 
more to repurchase his freedom, will place a higher value on a gain of two 
thousand ducats than does another man who has less money than he. (Bernoulli, 
1954, p. 25) 
  
But Bernoulli thought these examples represented “exceedingly rare exceptions” 
(Bernoulli, 1954, p. 25). 
 
Figure 2.15 
Bernoulli also elaborated the law of diminishing utility in mathematical language. 
AC is the wealth previously owned, CD is the increase of wealth, CG is the previous total 
                                                 
5 This graph is redrawn according to Bernoulli (1954, p. 26) and slightly revised. 
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utility, and rH is the small increase in utility corresponding to the increase of wealth. If 
AC is x, CG is y, rH is dy, and b designates the constant data, we get: 
x
dxbdy   
Assume the increment of wealth EF equals CD. The increment of utility sM is 
smaller tan rH, showing the law of diminishing utility. Besides, it should be noted that 
Bernoulli connected income (money) with utility, instead of quantity of goods. 
However, this demonstration was only an introduction of Bernoulli’s primary 
interest, “the solution of problems connected with making decisions under risk,” and 
economists finally paid attention to his marginal thought on this introductory part two 
hundred years later (Kauder, 1965, p. 34). But Bernoulli’s discovery of marginal utility 
and application of mathematics more or less influenced the Marginal Utility School and 
neoclassical economics. 
2.3. Bentham 
2.3.1. Utilitarianism 
In the eighteenth centuries, Jeremy Bentham was another writer who had the 
significant influence on the utility theory in the nineteenth century. Though Bentham’s 
thoughts involved many different subjects, just for economic thought, his utilitarianism 
and felicific calculus had significant influence on the Marginal Utility School. 
Bentham started from his utilitarianism. The law of utility (pleasure and pain) was 
the fundamental of his utilitarianism. “Nature has placed mankind under the governance 
of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure” (Bentham, 2007, p. 1). The principle of 
utility was the foundation of Bentham’s utilitarianism, and Bentham replaced the word 
 14 
“utility” with “happiness” and “felicity” in his later work, changing the principle into “the 
greatest happiness or greatest felicity principle”6 (Bentham, 2007, p. 1). The principle, 
which was the foundation of Bentham’s (2007) An introduction to the principles of 
morals and legislation, stated that pleasure and pain were the only standard of right and 
wrong, and they governed everyone’s every behavior. “The principle of utility recognises 
this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to 
rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law” (Bentham, 2007, pp. 1–2). 
According to Bentham, utility was the property “to produce benefit, advantage, 
pleasure, good, or happiness, or to prevent happening of mischief, pain, evil, or 
unhappiness” (Bentham, 2007, p. 2). The principle of utility was the principle that 
“approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it 
appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in 
question, or… to promote or to oppose that happiness” (Bentham, 2007, p. 2). In other 
words, pleasure and pain decided motives and drove actions of individuals. Whatever 
people did was based on the expectation of pleasure and pain. In this framework, the 
good or the right (motives and actions) brought pleasure and the evil or the wrong 
brought pain.7 
Though “all other principles than that of utility must be wrong,” there were 
principles adverse to that of utility, such as the principle of asceticism and the principle of 
                                                 
6 In an 1822 footnote, Bentham thought that the words happiness and felicity were better than utility to clearly indicate 
the ideas of pleasure and pain (Bentham, 2007, p. 1). However, in order to be loyal to Bentham’s original work, I still 
use “the principle of utility” in this thesis. 
 
7 This framework considered only the simple form of pleasure and pain, not complex actions or motives with a mixture 
of pleasure and pain. 
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sympathy and antipathy8 (Bentham, 2007, p. 8). The principle of asceticism was “the 
reveries of certain hasty speculators” and could not be consistently pursued by most 
people (Bentham, 2007, pp. 12–13). The principle of sympathy and antipathy was “rather 
a principle in name than in reality” and would frequently coincide with the principle of 
utility (Bentham, 2007, pp. 16, 18–20). Therefore, Bentham did not think that these two 
occasional conditions were the fundamental principles of humans and reasserted the sole 
essentiality of the principle of utility: “The principle of utility neither requires nor admits 
of any other regulator than itself” (Bentham, 2007, p. 23). 
2.3.2 Felicific Calculus 
Felicific calculus was another of Bentham’s contributions. “Truths that form the 
basis of political and moral science are not to be discovered but by investigations as 
severe as mathematical ones, and beyond all comparison more intricate and extensive” 
(Bentham, 2007, p. xii). Bentham attached importance to mathematics, introduced 
mathematics into social theory and created a series of methods to calculate utility, which 
gave utility more quantitative features. 
Bentham divided pleasure and pain into the simple and the complex. “The simple 
ones are those which cannot any one of them be resolved into more: complex are those 
which are resolvable into divers simple ones” (Bentham, 2007, p. 33). The examples of 
simple pleasures included: pleasure of sense, pleasure of wealth, pleasure of skill, 
pleasure of amity, pleasure of a good name, pleasure of power, pleasure of piety, pleasure 
of benevolence or good-will, pleasure of malevolence or ill-will, pleasure of memory, 
                                                 
8 Bentham omitted the theological principle, because he thought “it is never anything more or less than one or other of 
the three before-mentioned principles presenting itself under another shape” (Bentham, 2007, p. 21). The three 
principles were the principle of utility, the principle of asceticism, and the principle of sympathy and antipathy. 
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pleasure of imagination, pleasures of expectation, pleasure depending on association, and 
pleasure of relief. The examples of simple pains included: pain of privation, pain of sense, 
pain of awkwardness, pain of enmity, pain of an ill-name, pain of piety, pain of 
benevolence, pain of malevolence, pain of the memory, pain of the imagination, pain of 
expectation, and pain of association (Bentham, 2007, pp. 33–41). Complex pleasure and 
pain included: pleasures alone, pains alone, and a pleasure or pleasures and a pain or 
pains together (Bentham, 2007, p. 33). Bentham tried to summarize all of the kinds of 
pleasure and pain, but all of them could be attributed to the simple form of pleasure and 
pain and be calculated. This quantitative analysis was carried on to his further analysis of 
morals and legislation. 
For the quantitative aspect of utility, Bentham gave the way to calculate the value 
of simple pleasure and pain. First, to estimate a pleasure and a pain itself, we should 
consider its intensity, its duration, its certainty or uncertainty, and its propinquity or 
remoteness. Second, to estimate how much an action produces this pleasure and pain, we 
should consider its fecundity and its purity. Last, to estimate the total value of a pleasure 
and a pain for a group of people, we should consider its extent (Bentham, 2007, pp. 29–
31). Then, there were three ways to take an exact account of the general tendency of an 
action. First, calculate the value of each pleasure or pain produced by an action in the first 
instance. Second, calculate the value of each pleasure or pain produced by an action after 
the first. Last, sum up all the values of pleasures and all the values of pains. If the 
pleasure side was greater, the tendency was good; if the pain side was greater, the 
tendency was bad (Bentham, 2007, p. 31). Pleasure and pain differed from one person to 
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another, so Bentham used the seven factors to calculate the values, in order to quantify 
subjective pleasure and pain. According to the positivity or the negativity of the value of 
pleasure and pain that an action produced, an individual decided whether an action should 
be approved or disapproved and estimated degree devoted to that action. Then, because 
an action led by pleasure and pain could be observed, it could be risen to the social level, 
as a standard in his analysis of principles of morals and legislation. 
Two features of utility were thus apparent from Bentham’s felicific calculus. First, 
utility is a quantitative concept. Bentham tried to calculate social phenomena with 
mathematics, giving utility quantitative features. Second, utility was purely subjective. 
Though the method of calculation was fixed, pleasure and pain varied by individual, so 
the result was subjective. This subjectivity made the measurement of utility difficult and 
made interpersonal comparison impossible. 
2.3.3. Influence 
Bentham’s theory inspired the later development of philosophy, ethics, law 
science, politics, psychology, and others. For economics, especially for marginalism, 
Bentham laid several foundations. 
First, for his utilitarianism, utility (pleasure and pain) was the only way to 
determine the tendency of an action, including economic actions. Later, the Marginal 
Utility School thought that marginal utility was the determinant factor of economic value, 
and might inherit the utilitarianism of Bentham. Second, with his felicific calculus, utility 
can be calculated with mathematics. Bentham highly praised mathematics for the 
principle of utility in related fields, making utility a quantitative concept. Third, Bentham 
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repudiated all of the other principles and thought that utility was a homogenous property, 
without qualitative distinction. Marginalism inherited this feature and assumed that utility 
was the only determinant of economic value and mainly analyzed utility quantitatively. 
After Bentham, more and more writers studied utility. In the nineteenth century, 
some economists were giving the clear statement of the law of diminishing marginal 
utility, but failed to apply this law to economic problems; such economists include Lloyd 
(1833), Senior (1836), Jennings (1855), and Hearn (1864). There were other economists 
applying utility theory to economic events without explicitly developing the law of 
diminishing marginal utility, including A. Walras (1831) and Longfield (1834) (Stigler, 
1950, p. 313). However, compared with the representatives I choose, these writers 
achieved relatively less in utility theory. Instead, there were at least two economists who 
both elaborated the law and applied it to economic problems, but failed to convince most 
economists of their time. They were Jules Dupuit and Hermann Heinrich Gossen (Stigler, 
1950, p. 313). 
2.4. Dupuit 
2.4.1. More about Utility 
Jules Dupuit published his On the measurement of the utility of public works in 
1844. Dupuit tried to construct a theory of prices that maximized utility, and he 
distinguished total and marginal utility clearly and discovered consumers’ surplus (Stigler, 
1950, p. 313). 
Most of Dupuit’s thoughts about utility were based on J. B. Say. At the beginning 
of his paper, Dupuit briefly talked about the definition of utility: “In political economy, 
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utility is the power possessed by things of being able to serve man in some manner or 
other” (Dupuit, 1952, p. 256). Unlike Bentham, whose measurement of utility was 
subjective,  Dupuit also thought that “utility and its measurement lie at the foundation of 
political economy” (Dupuit, 1952, p. 256) and used price as the measurement of utility 
(Dupuit, 1952, p. 256). Measuring by price was different from the later Marginal Utility 
School, which used demand to infer utility, similar to the approach of classical political 
economics. Dupuit gave an example of the judgment of utility: “If society is paying 500 
million for the services rendered by the road, that only proves one thing — that their 
utility is at least 500 million. But it may be a hundred times or a thousand times 
greater…” (Dupuit, 1952, p. 256). This example also showed Dupuit’s consideration on 
demand and consumers’ surplus. 
Dupuit presented a few warnings when applying utility, with a few features of the 
classical political economy. First, production cost should also be considered to acquire 
economic value, but not as an independent factor. “Utility, thus understood, is the basis of 
the demand for products and consequently of their value. But this value does not exceed 
the costs of production…” (Dupuit, 1952, p. 256). Second, qualification of utility should 
not be ignored; utility should not just be a quantitative concept. Third, price as the 
measurement of utility is an objective factor.  
Though these “warnings” seem to contradict the Marginal Utility School, when 
Marshall and later neoclassical economists tried to synthesize the thoughts of the 
Marginal Utility School and classical political economy, they revealed that economic 
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value is governed by both utility and cost of production, thereby reflecting Dupuit’s 
wisdom. 
2.4.2. Diminishing Demand (Marginal Utility) 
Though Dupuit’s thoughts about utility were different than those of the later 
Marginal Utility School, Dupuit also tried to explain the law of marginal utility in his 
example. Dupuit used the optimum toll on a bridge to illustrate his ideas about demand 
and marginal utility. He did not explicitly explain the difference between demand and 
marginal utility, so he analyzed the two things in one diagram. 
 
Figure 2.29 
In Figure 2.2, NP is the demand (marginal utility) curve, which is a downward 
and slightly convex curve. If Or was the quantity consumed at the price Op, then Opnr 
was the absolute utility that consumers gained from the use of the bridge and rnN was the 
relative utility. If OR was the quantity consumed (decreasing by Rr) at the price OM, 
then OMTR was the absolute utility and RTN was the relative utility. Since the absolute 
utility could be considered as the expenditure that should be deducted, we only 
considered the relative utility, so the net gain of utility was qTn. Hence, when the price 
                                                 
9 The graph is redrawn according to Dupuit (1952, p. 280). 
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was zero, utility was maximized. Dupuit concluded that “the utility of a means of 
communication, and in general of any product, is at a maximum when the toll or the price 
is zero” (Dupuit, 1934, p. 161). However, Dupuit did not wholly advocate the zero toll:  
It will not be our conclusion, when we treat of tariffs; but we hope to have 
demonstrated that must be studied, combined on rational principles to produce 
simultaneously the greatest possible utility and a revenue which will repay the 
expense of maintenance and the interest on the capital investment. (Dupuit, 1934, 
p. 51)  
 
 Dupuit failed to complete his optimum price theory because he did not have a 
coherent theory of cost (Dupuit, 1934, pp. 52–53; Stigler, 1950, p. 314). His thoughts 
about production cost were within his theory of utility; production cost was not an 
independent factor in deciding economic value. Hence, despite Dupuit’s attempt to 
consider utility overall and his explicit formulation and application of marginal utility and 
consumer surplus, Dupuit did not attempt to devise a larger theoretical framework to 
solve his problems, and his work was not strictly within the framework either of the 
Marginal Utility School or of neoclassical economics. 
2.5. Gossen 
2.5.1. Gossen’s Crank 
Heinrich Gossen, a tragic figure in the history of economic thought, “hid his 
thought behind painfully complex arithmetical and algebraic exercises”, and he was 
profound and original but ignored by people in his time (Stigler, 1950, p. 314). Gossen, in 
his The development of the laws of human intercourse and the consequent rules of human 
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action in 1854, explicitly developed the theory of marginal utility,10 which was inherited 
by the three pioneer economists of the Marginal Utility School, especially Jevons:  
It is quite apparent that Gossen has completely anticipated me as regards the 
general principles and method of the theory of Economics. So far as I can gather, 
his treatment of the fundamental theory is even more general and thorough than 
what I was able to scheme out. (Jevons, 1957, p. xxxv) 
 
Gossen, much like Bentham and his principle of utility, founded his theory on 
pleasure and its maximum: “Enjoyment must be so arranged that the total life pleasure 
should be a maximum… Man should organize his life so that his total life pleasure 
becomes a maximum” (Gossen, 1983, pp. 1, 3). Gossen then explained the difference 
between the total pleasure and the magnitude (or intensity) of pleasure, and he revealed 
the law of the change of the magnitude of pleasure, which can be understood as the law 
of diminishing marginal utility today: “The magnitude [intensity] of pleasure decreases 
continuously if we continue to satisfy one and the same enjoyment without interruption 
until satiety is ultimately reached” (Gossen, 1983, p. 6). Gossen’s definition of pleasure 
was different from later neoclassical economics, which assumed the insatiability of 
human wants. 
Gossen’s magnitude pleasure was a function of time (duration): 
 
A similar decrease of the magnitude [intensity] takes place if we repeat a 
previously experienced pleasure. Not only does the initial magnitude [intensity] of 
the pleasure become smaller, but also the duration of the pleasure shortens, so that 
satiety is reached sooner. Moreover, the sooner the repetition, the smaller the 
initial magnitude [intensity] and the shorter the duration of the pleasure. (Gossen, 
1983, p. 6)  
 
                                                 
10 Gossen used pleasure instead of utility in his work, so “the magnitude or intensity of pleasure” can be understood as 
marginal utility. 
 23 
Gossen then used the quantity of commodities to replace time as the variable, as most 
economists analyzing utility do today: 
The single atoms of one and the same means of enjoyment have very different 
values, and, in general, for each individual only a definite number of atoms, that is, 
a definite quantity, has value. An increase in this quantity beyond this point is 
without any value for that individual, but this point of no value is reached only 
after the value has little by little moved through many gradations of magnitude… 
With the increase in that quantity, the value of each additional atom must decrease 
steadily until it sinks to zero. (Gossen, 1983, p. 35). 
Morever, Gossen tried to talk about the negative aspect of utility, in which labor 
generated discomfort (disutility).11 Gossen’s theory of the marginal disutility of labor was 
completely symmetrical with his theory of the marginal utility of consumer goods (Stigler, 
1950, p. 315):  
The value [pleasure] of what is obtained by effort is decreased exactly by the 
proper measure of the discomfort… Through labor we can increase our total life 
pleasure as long as the pleasure of what is produced by labor is valued [produces 
a pleasure that is] higher than the discomfort caused by labor. (Gossen, 1983, pp. 
40, 43)  
 
As illustrated in Figure 2.3, the two curves represented pleasure and discomfort. “The 
value reaches a maximum if the quantity ad  is produced, that is, if production is 
continued until [the intensity of] discomfort becomes equal to the [intensity of] value 
[pleasure]” (Gossen, 1983, p. 45). After a series of algebraic analysis, Gossen concluded:  
In order to maximize his life pleasure, man must distribute his time and energy 
among various pleasures in such a way that for every pleasure, the intensity of 
pleasure of the last atom produced shall be equal to the magnitude [intensity] of 
the discomfort experienced by him at the very last moment of his expenditure of 
effort. (Gossen, 1983, p. 53)  
 
                                                 
11 However, Gossen’s discomfort was not strictly the negative pleasure, and it could also be positive (see Figure 2.3. 
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The maximization of one’s life pleasure means the equalization of marginal utility and 
marginal disutility. In Figure 2.3, the line cb is the marginal utility curve and the line gf is 
the marginal disutility curve, so point e is the maximization of life pleasure. 
 
Figure 2.312 
Gossen was the first writer to explicitly get what Stigler (1950) called “the 
fundamental principle of marginal utility theory” (p. 315). This achievement marks “a 
long step forward in the development of the relationship between utility and demand 
curves” (Stigler, 1950, p. 315).  
Man obtains the maximum of life pleasure if he allocates all his earned money E 
between the various pleasures and determines the e in such a manner that the last 
atom of money spent for each pleasure offers the same amount [intensity] of 
pleasure. (Gossen, 1983, pp. 108–109)  
 
We can translate this statement into the prevailing mathematical form: 
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12 The graph is redrawn according to Gossen (1983, p. 44). 
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where MUi represents the marginal utility of the ith commodity and pi represents its price 
(Stigler, 1950, p. 315). 
Gossen also talked about measuring utility in quantity, like Dupuit, using money 
as measurement: 
We obtain a notion of the magnitudes of different spaces only by taking a certain 
space as yardstick, of the weights of different bodies by using a certain weight as 
measure, and so forth. Similarly, we have to decide on some one pleasure as a 
yardstick, and we can do this because one pleasure remains undetermined in the 
calculation. It does not matter which pleasure we use for this purpose. It may 
perhaps be convenient for the future if we use as unit the pleasure generated by 
the commodity serving as money. (Gossen, 1983, p. 146) 
  
However, Gossen did not solve problems like how to find which pleasure can be a 
yardstick, whether the money reflecting on this yardstick pleasure can also reflect other 
pleasures, and how to convert the significance among different pleasures. Hence, this 
measurement of utility was just a vague idea, and Gossen did not talk more about 
economic value (Stigler, 1950, p. 315). 
2.5.2. Gossen’s Laws 
Three economic laws were named after Gossen and were widely accepted by later 
economists. Among the three laws, the first two were about pleasure (utility). 
The first law can be regarded as the law of diminishing marginal utility: “The 
magnitude [intensity] of pleasure decreases continuously if we continue to satisfy one and 
the same enjoyment without interruption until satiety is ultimately reached” (Gossen, 
1983, p. 6). The marginal utility diminishes across the range relevant to the decision-
making. 
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Figure 2.413 
The second law was the law of equi-marginal utility:  
Man obtains the maximum of life pleasure if he allocates all his earned money E 
between the various pleasures and determines the e in such a manner that the last 
atom of money spent for each pleasure offers the same amount [intensity] of 
pleasure. (Gossen, 1983, pp. 108–109) 
 
This law presumed that pleasure could be quantified, and that there was an equilibrium at 
which an individual would allocate expenditures to reach an equal ratio between marginal 
utility and price across all goods and services consumed. Gossen’s maximization of 
pleasure (utility) can be shown in modern mathematical form: 
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The third law, omitted here, implied that scarcity of resources was a precondition 
for economic value:  
The external world has value for us, from which it follows that the value of the 
external world for us increases or decreases in direct proportion to the help it 
                                                 
13 The graph is redrawn according to Gossen (1983, p. 11) and slightly revised. 
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gives us in attaining our life’s purpose and that, consequently, the magnitude of 
its value is measured exactly by the magnitude of life pleasure that it gives us. 
(Gossen, 1983, p. 28)  
 
The external world was a precondition to influence pleasure humans gained. But Gossen 
did not further discuss scarcity or recognize the relationship between utility and scarcity. 
Moreover, Gossen insisted that pleasure (utility) was the only determinant of economic 
value, which made his theory one-sided, only focusing on the consumption and the 
demand side, and this feature was passed to his descendants. 
In all, the work of these four figures is representative of the work that influenced 
the Marginal Utility School. Bernoulli applied advanced mathematics to solve economic 
problems and revealed the diminishing law of marginal utility. Bentham defined utility as 
the dominant factor in social problems with subjective and quantitative features; the 
Marginal Utility School and neoclassical economics later followed this definition. Dupuit 
and Gossen further explained the law of diminishing marginal utility. In spite of the 
different definition of utility from the Marginal Utility School, Dupuit applied the law to 
a real problem. Gossen systematically interpreted the law and his utility theory could be 
regarded as a “bridge” from Bentham to Jevons. All of them, some creating new angles to 
valuation in economic thought and some developing new tools in economic research, laid 
a solid foundation for the Marginal Utility School in the 1870s. 
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Chapter Three: Utility Theory of the Three Pioneers in the 1870s 
“Value depends entirely on Utility.” — William Stanley Jevons (2012, p. 2) 
Three eminent books of the three pioneers that launched the Marginal Utility 
School came out at nearly the same time. William Stanley Jevons’s Theory of political 
economy and Carl Menger’s Principles of economics both appeared in 1871, and the first 
part of Léon Walras’s Elements of pure economics was published in 1874; its second part 
followed in 1877. The three books offered discussion of utility theory “far higher in 
quality and much greater in scope than that contained in the many earlier fragmentary 
discussions,” which provided “the sound base upon which the Marginal Utility School 
rose” (Howey, 1989, p. 39). In this chapter, because the concept of marginal utility is the 
core of the “Marginal Revolution,” I examine utility theory and its relevant topics of in 
the three books. Professor R. S. Howey’s The rise of the marginal utility school, 1870–
1889 is the major reference for this chapter, which helps me organize the structure and 
review the works of the three pioneers. 
3.1. Marginal Utility and Its Diminishing Law 
The term “marginal utility” did not appear in Jevons’s, Menger’s, and Walras’s 
original works. In fact, “marginal utility” did not enter the German language until 1884, 
English until 1888, and French even later (Howey, 1989, p. 39). Hence, like the writers 
before them, all three economists used synonyms equal to “marginal utility.” 
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Both Jevons and Walras employed the term “utility” with the meaning now usual 
in economics (Howey, 1989, p. 40). As Jevons described the definition of utility, “but it 
is convenient to transfer our attention as soon as possible to the physical objects or 
actions which are the source to us of pleasures or pains” (Jevons, 2012, p. 44). Jevons 
called the power of a good to satisfy wants “utility” (Howey, 1989, p. 41). More carefully, 
he mentioned that this power is not an intrinsic quality of goods, implying the subjective 
feature of utility, which was quite similar to what Bentham defined (Jevons, 2012, p. 52). 
As for the law of diminishing marginal utility,  
the variation of the function expressing the final degree of utility is the all-
important point in all economical problems. We may state, as a general law, that it 
varies with the quantity of commodity, and ultimately decreases as that quantity 
increases. (Jevons, 2012, p. 62)  
 
This was Jevons’ general statement of the law of diminishing marginal utility. 
Walras had the same approach as Jevons. At the beginning when introducing the 
concept of utility, Walras called marginal utility “intensive utility,” and then Walras 
suddenly began to use “rareté,” a term that he borrowed from his father and the term for 
marginal utility that was the most closely associated with the writings of Walras (Howey, 
1989, pp. 40–41). Specifically, Walras used “the term rareté [to] designate the intensity 
of the last want satisfied by any given quantity consumed of a commodity…” (Walras, 
2003, p. 119). From this point on, Walras used “rareté” and “intensity of the last want 
satisfied” to denote marginal utility (Howey, 1989, p. 41). Similar to Jevons, Walras 
emphasized it in all of the editions of his book that rareté must be “personal or 
subjective” (Wood, 1993 p. 81). As for the law of diminishing marginal utility, Walras’s 
general statement of the law of diminishing marginal utility was: “whether the curve be 
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continuous or discontinuous, I postulate that intensive utilities always diminish from that 
of the first unit or fraction of a unit consumed to that of the last unit or fraction of a unit 
consumed” (Walras, 2003, p. 118). 
Menger was slightly different from Jevons and Walras. Menger insisted that 
utility with the meaning now usual in economics “played no part in the determination of 
the value of a good” (Howey, 1989, p. 40). But in fact Menger was talking about the 
same concept as utility, which he described as the difference between satisfaction 
(without the quantitative feature) and the importance of satisfaction (with the quantitative 
feature). “We saw earlier that the different needs of men and very unequal in importance 
of satisfaction, being graduated from the importance of their lives down to the importance 
they attribute to a small passing enjoyment” (Menger, 2007, p. 125). Here, Menger 
employed “the importance of satisfactions,” thinking that though satisfaction did not vary 
in quantity, its importance did (Howey, 1989, p. 40). This importance of satisfaction was 
exactly the value and the value was not an intrinsic property of things: 
Value is therefore nothing inherent in goods, no property of them, but merely the 
importance that we first attribute to the satisfaction of our needs, that is, to our 
lives and well-being, and in consequence carry over to economic goods as the 
exclusive causes of the satisfaction of our needs. (Menger, 2007, p. 116) 
  
Also, Menger’s general statement of the law of diminishing marginal utility was: 
“the satisfaction of any one specific need has, up to a certain degree of 
completeness, relatively the highest importance, until eventually a stage is 
reached at which a more complete satisfaction of that particular need is a matter 
of indifference.” (Menger, 2007, p. 125) 
 
Table 3.1 summarizes the terms Jevons, Menger and Walras used for the concept 
of marginal utility. 
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 Marginal utility 
Jevons 
Final degree of utility 
Terminal utility 
Menger 
Importance of satisfactions 
Dependent utility 
Walras 
Intensive utility 
Intensity of the last want satisfied 
Rareté 
Table 3.1 
3.2. Utility for Production 
Jevons, Menger and Walras all wrote that the factors of production also yielded 
utility only when they produced goods that satisfied consumers’ wants (Howey, 1989, p. 
42). However, none of these pioneers discussed further the implication of production, and 
they believed that utility also determined production. This feature reflected that their 
theories emphasized the side of demand and consumption and repudiated the classical 
theory of cost of production.14 
Compared with the other two economists, Menger studied utility for production 
more elaborately. He divided goods into different orders, from the first order to the 
highest order. Direct satisfaction was related to the first order goods which were 
immediately suited to consumption, and indirect satisfaction was related to the higher 
order. The higher order goods depended upon the values of the first order goods. 
The fact that goods of first order have a direct and goods of second order an 
indirect causal relation with the satisfaction of our needs gives rise to no 
                                                 
14 Considering the time at which they were writing, when the political economy was dominated by classical economics 
and its cost of production valuation, we may understand the desire of the three pioneers to introduce something new by 
critiquing or avoiding former achievements. 
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difference in the essence of that relationship, since the requirement for the 
acquisition of goods-character is the existence of some causal connection, but not 
necessarily one that is direct, between things and the satisfaction of human needs. 
(Menger, 2007, p. 57)  
 
Hence, the production of the higher order goods relied on the consumption of the first 
order goods, utility as the determination to this consumption and then production. 
Jevons used the term “mediate utility” for the utility from production factors and 
the term “immediate utility” for the utility from consumption goods (Jevons, 2012, p. 74). 
Jevons began, like Menger did, by analyzing the determination of the value of 
consumption goods, and then he tried to tie the production analysis to the consumption, 
but he never finished this analysis. On the one hand, for Jevons, not only was value based 
on utility, but his subsequent theory (including production analysis) also was. For 
example, he thought that labor was “any painful exertion of body or mind undergone with 
the view to future good” (Jevons, 2012, p. 164) and that labor was “to determine value, 
but only in an indirect manner, by varying the degree of utility of the commodity through 
an increase in the supply” (Jevons 2012: 2), like the concept of “disutility” later 
introduced by his followers. On the other hand, Jevons’s arguments about production 
were vague, for he was sort of stuck in the traditional framework of labor, rent, and 
capital; he spent three chapters on these topics, not completely establishing a production 
theory based on consumption or utility (Howey, 1989, p. 42; Jevons, 2012, pp. 162–253). 
Walras provided a relatively complete system through mathematics, where “n” 
equations of production services and “m” equations of demand for products determined 
all unknowns. The values of all products and all factors were completely interconnected 
in his system (Howey, 1989, p. 42; Walras, 2003, p. 239). 
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3.3. Utility for Exchange 
Jevons, Menger and Walras all noted that “the usefulness of many goods 
frequently comes from the fact that these goods command other goods in exchange, 
rather than from the direct satisfaction that the goods return their owners” (Howey, 1989, 
pp. 42–43). They distinguished goods for direct use and goods for indirect use. Indirect 
use was for exchange. 
Walras discussed this distinction less than the other two writers.  
Once all things that can be appropriated (that is, all scarce things and nothing else) 
have been appropriated, they stand in a certain relationship to each other, a 
relationship which stems from the fact that each scarce thing, in addition to its 
own specific utility, acquires a special property, namely, that of being 
exchangeable against any other scarce thing in such and such a determinate ratio. 
(Walras, 2003, p. 67) 
 
Walras used the term “specific utility” to denote the utility directly derived from goods. 
According to Jevons,  
things which have no direct utility may be the means of procuring us such by 
exchange, and they may therefore be said to have indirect utility. To the latter 
form of utility I have elsewhere applied the name acquired utility. (Jevons, 2012, 
p. 74)  
 
Jevons noted that people valued goods, not only because goods had direct utility when 
consumed, but also because people exchanged them for acquired utility. Jevons used the 
term “acquired utility” for the things with the power of “procuring commodities 
possessing immediate and direct utility — that is, the power of satisfying want” through 
exchange (Jevons, 2012, p. 74). Jevons talked about the reason and the result of trade, but 
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he finally failed to make further use of acquired utility or discuss further gains from 
trade.15 
But the power of exchanging one commodity for another greatly extends the 
range of this utility. We are no longer limited to considering the degree of utility 
of a commodity as regards the wants of its immediate possessor; for it may have a 
higher usefulness to some other person, and can be transferred to that person in 
exchange for some commodity of superior utility to the purchaser. The general 
result of exchange is, that all commodities sink, as it were, to the same level of 
utility in respect of the last portions consumed. (Jevons, 2012, p. 130) 
 
Menger also used the words “direct” and “indirect” to describe the distinction 
between the commodities obtained for the consumption of the commodity itself and as a 
means of exchange. Menger divided value into use value and exchange value, but these 
two terms had the different meaning with “use value” and “exchange value” in the 
classical framework. The two types of value depended on whether commodities derived 
their “value by being employed directly in the first case and indirectly in the second” 
(Menger, 2007 p. 228). Menger also said that a few goods might have only use value or 
exchange value, but most goods had both. The degree of each value determined the 
importance of satisfaction (direct or indirect) and the final economic value. 
Table 3.2 summarizes the terms the three thinkers used for different levels of 
utility. 
                                                 
15 Later, Edgeworth developed the theory of gains from trade based on Jevons’s utility theory. 
 Utility for use Utility for production / exchange 
Jevons Immediate utility 
Mediate utility (for production) 
Acquired utility (for exchange) 
Menger Direct satisfaction Indirect satisfaction 
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Table 3.2 
3.4. Discontinuity and Indivisibility 
Both Jevons and Walras used mathematical models, so they found it convenient 
and necessary to assume the continuous divisibility of quantities. Then they realized that 
their models did not fit reality, because all or most, of quantities could not divide in their 
ways. Hence, they amended their basic models to consider indivisibility in the quantities 
of goods consumed (Howey, 1989, p. 45). However, in spite of these attempts, 
divisibility and continuous variation still remained primary in Jevons’s and Walras’s 
work. 
Jevons began his analysis with finite increments, but soon found that the law of 
diminishing marginal utility “may be considered to hold true theoretically, however small 
the increments are made” (Howey, 1989, p. 45; Jevons, 2012, p. 57). Jevons then decided, 
“in every sale of a house, factory, or other building, it is usually impracticable to make 
any division without greatly lessening the utility of the whole” (Jevons, 2012, p. 120). 
Jevons realized that discontinuities occurred everywhere in the real world. To fit such 
discontinuities into his general model, he constructed special models. The first one was 
for the exchange of two indivisible goods (paper and wine), where the equations of 
exchange changed into two inequalities, which showed that two traders preferred the 
good of the other (Howey, 1989, p. 45; Jevons, 2012, p. 125). The second model, about 
bottles of ink, was more elaborate. Using the graph in Figure 3.1, Jevons showed that 
“three bottles will be purchased, but the fourth will not be purchased unless the space 
p3q3q4p4 exceed in area p3r3r4p4” (Jevons, 2012, pp. 125–126). This model indicated that 
Walras Specific utility  
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the buyer must decide whether “each successive bottle gives more utility than the utility 
the money would return if spent elsewhere” (Howey, 1989, p. 45). However, these were 
just several attempts that Jevons made to fix his models to fit reality, and his basic 
models still assumed continuity. Generally, Jevons’s primary goal was to make 
economics an “exact science,” so in order to apply mathematical tools like calculus, his 
basic models had to assume continuity and divisibility. 
Nay, finding that the quantities with which we have to deal are subject to 
continuous variation, I do not hesitate to use the appropriate branch of 
mathematical science, involving though it does the fearless consideration of 
infinitely small quantities. (Jevons, 2012, p. 4) 
 
Hence, Jevons’s changes to his model were not significant but showed only the worry 
about his models not fitting reality. 
 
Figure 3.116 
Walras did not discuss discontinuities in his first edition. However, in his second 
edition, he found the problem of discontinuous variables in individual demand curves 
(Howey, 1989, p. 45). Walras drew a “step curve” to express the discontinuous individual 
demand curve and provided a solution similar to Jevons’s (see Figure 3.2). Also, Walras 
                                                 
16 The graph is redrawn according to Jevons (2012, p. 126). 
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thought that the aggregate demand curve could be considered “continuous by virtue of 
the so-called law of large numbers,” but this justification offered him little consolation, 
because his models were mainly based on utility functions instead of empirical demand 
functions (subject to aggregation) (Walras, 2003, pp. 95, 97; Howey, 1989, pp. 45–46). 
Late in his book, Walras made another attempt to handle discontinuous utility functions, 
by “the substitution of continuous functions for discontinuous ones, presumably as 
approximations” (Walras, 2003, p. 577; Howey, 1989, p. 46). Here, his “approximation” 
might be the best way to explain the rough conditions of the real world. Like Jevons, 
these revisions were mainly to make his models that assumed continuity better fit the real 
world, instead of changing the basic models themselves. 
 
Figure 3.217 
Hence, although Jevons and Walras made several attempts to consider the 
discontinuity and indivisibility to fit the reality, their models mainly remained continuous 
and divisible. The continuous variation not only was the prerequisite for their marginal 
analysis with the derivative, but also became a fundamental assumption for later 
                                                 
17 The graph is redrawn according to Walras (2003, p. 97). 
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neoclassical economics. Starting from Bernoulli who introduced calculus to social 
problems, the discussion of marginal utility was much suited for this powerful tool 
(Kauder, 1965, 31). First, for marginal analysis studied the change in the dependent 
variable with one additional unit of the independent variable, it was in accordance with 
what the partial derivative in calculus described, and continuum was a representative 
property for calculus, so the quantities in economics also had the property of continuity if 
calculated by calculus. Second, since both Jevons and Walras thought highly of applying 
mathematics in economics, especially Jevons who wanted to make economics “an exact 
science” (Jevons, 2012, p. 14), the adoption of continuity met their wishes. With the 
assumption of continuity in their models, they could calculate both the small and great 
numbers that did not exist in most real conditions, like physics, to study the tiny 
differences, to predict the remote huge changes and to continue other theoretical research 
that was hard to be observed in reality. Hence, continuity played an important role in not 
only the most of their models but also the expectation of Jevons and Walras to make 
economic exact and mathematical. However, it should be noticed that not all of the 
representative figures of the utility theory before and in the 1870s adhered to calculus and 
the assumption of continuity. For example, some early writers, Galiani, Bentham and 
Lloyd, still used the literary method (Kauder, 1965, 31). Also, Menger, unlike the other 
two pioneers, followed this non-calculus tradition. 
Different from Jevons and Walras, Menger employed arithmetic tables, the 
quantities were originally discontinuous in his models, so he did not need to alter his 
analysis to consider indivisible goods (Menger, 2007, pp. 125–128), and he interpreted 
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his marginal thought without continuous variation. Menger even emphasized 
discontinuities repeatedly in other parts of his work (Howey, 1989, p. 45; Menger, 2007, 
pp. 118, 140, 145, 162). In addition, Menger’s immediate successors in Vienna also never 
used continuous functions (Howey, 1989, p. 45). 
3.5. Measurement 
Jevons, Menger and Walras all implied the measurability of pleasures, wants, or 
utilities. They assumed the measurability of these things, but no one ever measured them 
in quantities. Hence, the measurement of subjective quantities is still a lively topic in 
modern economics (Howey, 1989, p. 46). Generally, Jevons was the most explicit. Jevons 
denied that utility was directly measurable, but he devised a way of measurement: money 
(Stigler, 1950, p. 317). Menger and Walras said nothing about the existence of utility as 
indicative of an equally complete acceptance, and they both glossed over measurability of 
utility (Stigler, 1950, p. 317). 
This problem worried Menger least (Howey, 1989, p. 46): 
I need hardly point out that the figures in the text are not intended to express 
numerically the absolute but merely the relative magnitudes of importance of the 
satisfactions in question. Thus when I designate the importance of two 
satisfactions with 40 and 20 for example, I am merely saying that the first of the 
two satisfactions has twice the importance of the second to the economizing 
individual concerned. (Menger, 2003, p. 183)  
 
Menger unintentionally introduced the cardinal utility, because he stated that the first 
satisfaction was twice the second. He chose both a zero point and a certain unit of 
measurement, while the smallest satisfaction would add nothing to the total satisfaction 
and the greatest satisfaction would have an arbitrary importance of value of ten. In 
between these two extremes, there were nine other stages of satisfaction (Howey, 1989, 
 40 
pp. 46–47; Menger, 2003, pp. 125–128). However, Menger’s Austrian successors did not 
follow his cardinal ways but generally adopted the ordinal measures. 
Walras thought that utility was immeasurable at least at his time, but he also 
anticipated that it could be measurable (Howey, 1989, p. 47). He could not find a way of 
measuring utility but assumed later economists would discover such a way (Walras, 2007, 
p. 117). Walras assumed a cardinal measurement of utility, but he did not clarify it. 
However, he admitted that his assumption made his utility functions not determinable, 
and demand functions based on utility functions should be empirical (Walras, 2007, p. 
126). Hence, demand could be measured so that the utility could be inferred from demand 
measures. Walras stopped the discussion at Dupuit’s error and pointed out that he had 
regarded all the inadequacies of the analysis of Dupuit, which was failure to perceive “the 
maximum pecuniary sacrifice which a consumer is willing to make” (Walras, 2007, pp. 
445–446; Howey, 1989, p. 47). 
Among the three pioneers, Jevons was the only one who offered the hope that, 
although measurement was impossible at his time, it might be possible in the future 
(Howey, 1989, p. 47; Jevons, 2012, p. 9). Jevons pointed out that measurement had come 
slowly in studies other than economics (Howey, 1989, p. 47): “Previous to the time of 
Pascal, who would have thought of measuring doubt and belief?”, and he gave a series of 
examples, including petty games of chance, electricity, and heat (Jevons, 2012, pp. 9–10). 
We know it as a magnitude before we give it a name: any child can discover the 
more that there is in a bullet, and the less that there is in a cork of twice its size. 
Had it not been for the simple contrivance of the balance, which we are well 
assured (how, it matters not here) enables us to poise equal weights against one 
another, that is, to detect equality and inequality, and thence to ascertain how 
many times the greater contains the less, we might not to this day have had much 
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clearer ideas on the subject of weight, as a magnitude, than we have on those of 
talent, prudence, or self-denial, looked at in the same light. All who are ever so 
little of geometers will remember the time when their notions of an angle, as a 
magnitude, were as ‘vague as, perhaps more so than, those of a moral quality; and 
they will also remember the steps by which this vagueness became clearness and 
precision.’ Now there can be no doubt whatever that pleasure, pain, labour, utility, 
value, wealth, money, capital &c. are all notions admitting of quantity: nay, the 
whole of our actions in industry and trade certainly depend upon comparing 
quantities of advantage or disadvantage. (Jevons, 2012, p. 11) 
 
Jevons also mentioned Bentham’s measurement of pleasure and pain to test legislation, 
but Jevons did not know where to find Bentham’s numerical data (Jevons, 2012, pp. 11–
12). In spite of this, Jevons had a strong belief in the abundance of data in political 
economics:  
‘Then where’, the reader will perhaps ask, ‘are your numerical data for estimating 
pleasures and pains in Political Economy?’ I answer, that my numerical data are 
more abundant and precise than those possessed by any other science but that we 
have not yet known how to employ them… The private account books, the great 
ledgers of merchants and bankers and public offices, the share lists, price lists, 
bank returns, monetary intelligence, Custom-house and other Government return, 
are full of the kind of numerical data required to render Political Economy an 
exact mathematical science. (Jevons, 2012, pp. 12–13) 
  
However, Jevons said he failed to apply this large amount of data in his theory, and 
Jevons did not construct utility curves from these data, for two reasons: “want of 
methods” and “want of completeness” (Jevons, 2012, p. 13). So Jevons’s failure to use 
the data was his first problem, and his second excuse seemed to contradict his belief in 
the abundance of data (Howey, 1989, p. 48). “I know not when we shall have a perfect 
system of statistics, but the want of it is the only insuperable obstacle in the way of 
making Political Economy an exact science.” (Jevons, 2012, p. 14). Jevons mentioned the 
importance of “perfect statistics” as the prerequisite for his measurement of utility.  
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We can no more know or measure gravity in its own nature than we can measure 
a feeling, but just as we measure gravity by its effects in the motion of a 
pendulum, so we may estimate the equality or inequality of feelings by the 
varying decisions of the human mind. The will is our pendulum, and its 
oscillations are minutely registered in all the price lists of the markets. (Jevons, 
2012, p. 14)  
 
Unlike Walras, who thought that utility could be only roughly inferred from demand, 
Jevons believed that utility could be exactly measured unless economics became an 
“exact science” and his expected “perfect statistics” was created. Instead of finding 
“perfect statistics,” Jevons used demand functions as “approximations of utility function 
with price as a rough measure of marginal utility” (Howey, 1989, pp. 48–49). Hence, 
though failing to find a direct way of measurement, Jevons thought that utility could be 
exactly measured through demand, just like gravity measured indirectly through 
pendulum in physics. 
Elsewhere, Jevons talked about measurement with a more cautious attitude: 
“Because we have no means of defining and measuring quantities of feeling, like we can 
measure a mile, or a right angle, or any other physical quantity” (Jevons, 2012, p. 19). 
This attitude was opposite to his earlier high hope that utility could be exactly measured 
cardinally. Instead, Jevons limited himself to an ordinal view of utility (Howey, 1989, p. 
49):  
But we only employ units of measurement in other things to facilitate the 
comparison of quantities; and if we can compare the quantities directly, we do not 
need the units… I should not for a moment think of claiming for the mind any 
accurate power of measuring and adding and subtracting feelings, so as to get an 
exact balance. We can seldom or never affirm that one pleasure is a multiple of 
another in quantity… It seldom involves the comparison of quantities of feeling 
differing much in amount. (Jevons, 2012, pp. 19–20) 
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Jevons then returned to his cardinal conception when considering pleasure and pain 
(Howey, 1989, p. 49): “Two days of the same degree of happiness are to be twice as 
much desired as one day; two days of suffering are to be twice as much feared” (Jevons, 
2012, p. 35), which implied his consideration in cardinal utility. However, using the 
graph in Figure 3.3, Jevons also assumed the diminishing intensity of the pleasure in the 
equivalent unit of time. Specifically, “utility must be considered as measured by, or even 
as actually identical with, the addition made to a person’s happiness” (Jevons, 2012, p. 
53–54). Then like Walras that utility was inferred from demand, Jevons used demand 
curves as approximations of utility curves as he designed in the previous passages, only 
after he introduced utility functions in the determination of exchange rates, and the utility 
functions in the analysis of exchange assumed cardinal utility. However, this assumption 
did not stand out, because he “used a general functional notation and illustrated his 
conclusions with graphs of utility curves that retain only the principal characteristics he 
attributed to his generalized functions,” so he missed “some of the concreteness he had 
found in the physical sciences where the investigator determines the shape and 
parameters of the functions he uses” (Howey, 1989, p. 49–50). 
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Figure 3.318 
Third, Jevons discussed the measurement of utility, returning to an optimistic tone 
by assuming the utility of money was constant (Howey, 1989, p. 50): 
And if we could tell exactly how much people reduce their consumption of each 
important article when the price rises, we could determine, at least approximately 
the variation of the final degree of utility — the all-important element in 
Economy. (Jevons, 2012, p. 140) 
 
“For the first approximation we may assume that the general utility of a person’s 
income is not affected by the changes of price of the commodity” (Jevons, 2012, p. 140). 
Hence, we can get the equation: 
cmx  .  
Here, m  was the existing ratio of exchange. “We may have many different corresponding 
values for x  and m , we may treat c , the utility of money, as a constant, and determine 
the general character of the function x , the final degree of utility” (Jevons, 2012, p. 141). 
Using this assumption, Jevons could finally approximate, not just infer, utility curves 
with demand curves (Howey, 1989, p. 50). 
3.6. Interpersonal Comparison 
Bentham’s assumption of subjective utility meant that utility varied across 
individuals. Though Jevons, Menger and Walras all supposed cardinal measurement of 
utility, none of them found a way to compare interpersonally, because the units that one 
individual chose had no relation to the units that another chose (Howey, 1989, p. 51). 
                                                 
18 The graph is redrawn according to Jevons (2012, p. 36). 
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Only Jevons emphasized the impossibility of interpersonal comparison (Howey, 
1989, p. 51). Menger avoided the topic and Walras made only an incidental comparison 
(Stigler, 1950, p. 318). Jevons explained: 
The reader will find, again, that there is never, in a single instance, an attempt 
made to compare the amount of feeling in one mind with that in another. I see no 
means by which such comparison can ever be accomplished. The susceptibility of 
one mind may, for what we know, be a thousand times greater than that of another. 
But, provided that the susceptibility was different in a like ratio in all directions, 
we should never be able to discover the profoundest differences. Every mind is 
thus inscrutable to every other mind, and no common denominator of feeling is 
possible. (Jevons, 2012, p. 21) 
 
Though all three pioneers avoided interpersonal comparison, they had a few rough 
discussions about its possibility (Howey, 1989, p. 51). Jevons’s attempt to compare the 
marginal utility of the same amount of money for poor and rich people (Jevons, 2012, p. 
133) contradicted his claim of the impossibility of interpersonal comparisons. But if his 
assumption of constant utility of money income was questionable, utility of money to 
different individuals was as subjective as other goods and also could not be directly 
compared. Menger indicated the difference in the value according to importance of 
satisfaction among different individuals: “For the use value of one and the same good is 
usually very different for two different individuals, since it depends upon the 
requirements of and quantities available to each of them” (Menger, 2003, p. 299). Walras 
faced the difficulty without the assumption of interpersonal comparison, while analyzing 
free competition maximizes the utilities of an economy (Howey, 1989, p. 52).  
Though Walras supposes that rareté can be defined as a cardinal magnitude, 
nowhere does he allude to any actual addition of the utilities enjoyed by different 
persons… Either Walras means by maximum utility for society as a whole a 
situation in which it is impossible to increase the utility of any one party without 
decreasing that of another once competitive equilibrium has been attained or he 
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means something so vague as to defy any clear interpretation at all. (Walras, 2007, 
p. 511, translator’s notes) 
 
3.7. Utility Function 
None of these three economists explicitly discussed the form of the utility 
function that they used, and all of them used the utility function in which the marginal 
utility of a good depended only on the quantity of that good alone, without any other 
variable, such as the income, the distribution of the income, the quantity consumed by 
other people, and complementary and substitute goods (Howey, 1989, p. 53). Moreover, 
the economists’ analyses were static, mentioning the importance of time but not including 
it in their basic models. Although their analyses were limited to their time periods, they 
focused on repudiating the classical political economy and establishing new theories of 
their own, instead of further interpreting them. Even though Jevons, Menger and Walras 
failed to develop their theories more deeply, the work of these pioneers still influences 
modern economic study, in which many mainstream beginning economics textbooks 
repeat their static utility-quantity analysis. 
All three economists emphasized that “the marginal utility decreases when the 
quantity of the good increases,”—that is, the law of diminishing marginal utility—and 
none of them gave an exception to this fundamental law (Howey, 1989, p. 53). As Jevons 
said: 
No commodity can be named which we continue to desire with the same force, 
whatever be the quantity already in use or possession. All our appetites are 
capable of satisfaction or satiety sooner or later, both these words meaning, 
etymologically, that we have had enough so that more is of no use to us. (Jevons, 
2012, pp. 62–63) 
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All of Jevons’ curves were concave. Both the tabular representations of Menger and the 
curves from Walras’s first edition were linear. The second edition of Walras quoted 
Dupuit, who assumed the utility curve was concave. Concave utility functions implied the 
assumption of risk aversion that commonly existed in individuals’ decision-making, 
which became a basic assumption of the demand theory of marginalism and later 
neoclassical economics. 
Jevons, Menger and Walras all analyzed the utility function only in static forms 
and never used dynamic functions; though they all mentioned “time,” they passed 
dynamic analysis to their successors. For example, Jevons explained:  
It is only as a purely statical problem that I can venture to treat the action of 
exchange… If we wished to have a complete solution of the problem in all its 
natural complexity, we should have to treat it as a problem of dynamics. But it 
would surely be absurd to attempt the more difficult question when the more easy 
one is yet so imperfectly within our power. (Jevons, 2012, pp. 93–94)  
 
Similarly, Walras stated: 
I am assuming that, during this interval, the utility both extensive and intensive, 
remains fixed for each party, which makes it possible for me to include time 
implicitly in the expression of utility. Were this not the case and had I supposed 
utility to be a variable functionally related to time, then time would have to figure 
explicitly in the problem. And we should then have passed from economic statics 
to economic dynamics. (Walras, 2007, p. 117)  
 
Menger essentially agreed: 
Even if human needs can be considered unlimited in their development into the 
most distant periods of the future, they are nevertheless capable of quantitative 
determination for all given, and especially for all economically significant, time 
periods. Thus, even under the assumption of uninterrupted progress in the 
development of human needs, we have to deal with finite and never with infinite, 
and thus completely indeterminate, magnitudes if we concern ourselves only with 
definite time periods. (Menger, 2003, p. 83)  
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The three pioneers emphasized the importance of dynamic analysis and saw their 
incapability to complete such work. Moreover, they implied that they believed that their 
static analysis could fit with dynamic analysis to some degrees in the future. 
3.8. Abstract Quality 
Jevons, Menger and Walras all assumed that satisfaction from diverse goods had a 
common abstract quality, so that an individual could sum it up and compare different 
goods personally (Howey, 1989, p. 55). This idea was similar to Bentham’s felicific 
calculus—making utility an identical quantitative concept and not for qualitative analysis, 
which met the need of applying mathematics to make social analysis empirical and 
scientific, so none of the three pioneers would like to discuss more about the usefulness 
of goods within the classical framework. In their work, utility was an abstract, 
homogenous concept, different from heterogeneous usefulness in classical economics. 
This characteristic might influence their successors to focus on quantitative analysis and 
ignore the qualitative aspects of social phenomena for a long period. Qualitative analysis 
might be suited for finding what factors fit a social phenomenon well, so without it 
economics might incorrectly analyze a phenomenon, such as a crisis. 
Though interpersonal comparison seemed impossible at their time, the abstract 
quality of utility allowed for the possibility of comparison of utility derived from 
different goods for an individual, and the marginal utility of income (or money) was 
acquired from this assumption of comparability. However, neither Menger nor Walras 
explicitly referred to this idea or used the idea in subsequent analysis; only Jevons had a 
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good notion of the marginal utility of income and made considerable use of it (Howey, 
1989, p. 55). As his definition of marginal utility of income, 
it will be seen that we can now conceive, in an accurate manner, the utility of 
money, or of the supply of commodity which forms a person’s livelihood. Its final 
degree of utility is measured by that of any the other commodities which he 
consumes. (Jevons, 2012, p. 133) 
 
Jevons used the example of the utility of a penny for a poor family and a rich family to 
illustrate that the reason that marginal utility of income decreased as income increased 
was the same as the reason for diminishing marginal utility of goods (Jevons, 2012, p. 
133). Before the introduction of marginal utility of income, Jevons presumed the 
marginal utility of money to be constant: 
A person’s expenditure on salt is an inconsiderable item of expense; what he 
spends thus does not make him appreciably poorer; yet, if he established price or 
ratio is one penny for each pound of salt, he buys in any time, say one year, so 
many pounds that an additional pound would not have so much utility to him as a 
penny. (Jevons, 2012, p. 112)  
 
However, in another example of meat, Jevons explained, 
this case must not be confused with that of purchases which appreciably affect the 
possessions of the purchaser. Thus, if a poor family purchase much butchers-meat, 
they will probably have to go without something else. The more they buy, the 
lower the final degree of utility of the meat and the higher the final degree of 
utility of something else;19 and thus these purchases will be the more narrowly 
limited. (Jevons, 2012, p. 113) 
 
Jevons used the graph in Figure 3.1 to show that with a curve of constant marginal utility 
of income and a curve of diminishing marginal utility of bottles of ink, the optimum 
number of bottles of ink was decided by the curves’ intercept point (Jevons, 2012, pp. 
                                                 
19 This statement also implied that Jevons realized that the utility of a good changed with the consumption of its 
complementary and substitute goods. 
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125–126) “This was the first demand curve ever drawn that makes explicit the 
assumption of the constancy of marginal utility of income” (Howey, 1989, p. 56) 
3.9. Maximization of Utility 
Different from early writers on utility such as Bernoulli, Senior, and Dupuit, who 
never used utility for analysis of equilibrium in exchange, Jevons, Menger and Walras all 
used their utility functions in connection with the problem of exchange and value, which 
was “the most important advance in utility analysis and the beginning of the Marginal 
Utility School” (Howey, 1989, p. 56). Though the pursuit of self-interest had been long 
accepted among economists, the notion of maximization of utility that determined 
economic quantities such as value and output was a relatively fresh idea. This approach 
was different from the prevailing focus on “needs” in classical political economy, which 
should be “enough”; and instead utility was more related to “wants,” which should be 
“more” and could be maximized. 
Instead of the maximization, Menger talked about the notion of “effectiveness” at 
the beginning of his discussion of economy: 
In what follows, it will first be shown how men arrive at a knowledge of their 
requirements for future time periods; it will then be shown how they estimate the 
quantities of goods that will be at their disposal during these time periods; and 
finally a description will be given of the activity by which men endeavor to direct 
the quantities of goods (consumption goods and means of production) at their 
disposal to the most effective satisfaction of their needs. (Menger, 2003, p. 80) 
 
Jevons also talked about the maximization of utility:  
To satisfy our wants to the utmost with the least effort — to procure the greatest 
amount of what is desirable at the expense of the least that is undesirable — in 
other words, to maximise comfort and pleasure, is the problem of Economy. 
(Jevons, 2012, p. 44) 
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The principle of maximization of utility in exchange appeared as a broad 
empirical observation in Walras’s first edition but was reduced to a hypothetical 
proposition in his second edition (Walras, 2007, pp. 569–570, translator’s notes). Walras 
described the maximization of utility with his equations and graphs, and included an 
example of the description of the maximum condition: 
If we suppose that his object in trading is to gratify the greatest possible sum total 
of wants, then, surely da is determined for a given pa by the condition that sum of 
the two areas, Oyββr,1 and Odaααr,1 be maximized. Now the condition of such 
a maximum is that the ratio of the intensities ra,1 and rb,1 of the last wants satisfied 
by the quantities da and y, i.e. the ratio of their respective raretés upon completion 
of this exchange, be equal to the price pa. (Walras, 2007, p. 121) 
 
However, regrettably, the three economists failed to obtain the maximizing 
conditions, by “pointing to the quantities to be maximized, then stating the conditions to 
which the maximization was subject (budget conditions), and next developing at least the 
necessary conditions (if not the sufficient) for a maximum,” and all of them, 
began their analysis, not with the total utility function of the consumer, of which 
all three certainly knew the importance, but with the marginal utility functions 
which they could use immediately to express the conditions of the maximum. 
(Howey, 1989, pp. 57–58) 
 
On the topic of maximization, later neoclassical economists such as Hicks studied 
these economists’ problems and more completely analyzed the assumption of human 
insatiable wants and scarcity of resources. 
3.10. Demand Function 
Menger had a loose idea of demand functions and presented them with only a few 
verbal references (Howey, 1989, p. 59): “The higher or lower level of the price has, as we 
saw, a very important influence on the total sales of a commodity as well as on the 
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quantity that each competing buyer will actually acquire” (Menger, 2003, p. 219). In 
addition, Menger discussed pricing under bilateral monopoly, duopoly, and competition 
(Stigler, 1950, p. 318). 
Walras began his analysis with given demand curves and got his equilibrium 
without saying a word about utility, but he later introduced utility as the foundation of his 
demand curves (Howey, 1989, p. 59). The Walrasian demand function was the 
relationship between the quantity and all prices of a commodity, holding individuals’ 
money and utility functions constant (Stigler, 1950, pp. 319–320): 
If, in fact, prices result mathematically from demand curves, the causes and 
primary conditions that generate and affect demand curves will also generate and 
affect prices… It depends upon a certain kind of utility of the commodity which 
we shall call extensive utility… It depends upon another type of utility of the 
commodity which we shall call intensive utility. (Walras, 2007, pp. 115–116) 
 
Both the extensive utility and the intensive utility were the one attribute of utility, and 
utility was still the only basis of Walras’s prices and demand curves. 
Jevons hoped to discover some ways to obtain data for utility curves, but he failed. 
Though Jevons’s demand curves were similar to Walras’s, they were founded on 
different assumptions. Jevons’s curves, with the assumption that the exchange did not 
change the marginal utility of his own good, namely the constant marginal utility of 
money, were approximations of utility function with price, which were more similar to 
the demand curves that later became popular (Howey, 1989, pp. 59–60). However, 
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Jevons’s attempt to connect utility and demand was seriously hampered, probably due to 
his inability to translate his thoughts into mathematics (Stigler, 1950, p. 318).20 
3.11. Repudiation of Labor Theory of Value 
In the late nineteenth century, the labor theory of value had more prestige and 
more followers than any opposing theory of value, but Jevons, Menger and Walras all 
explicitly repudiated the labor theory of value, and this repudiation shaped a common 
bond among them (Howey, 1989, p. 58). The reason that they rejected the labor theory of 
value was probably the essential difference in economic valuation. They intended to 
establish a new utility theory of value and the subsequent economic theory based on it, 
which fundamentally contradicted the production cost or labor theory of value. No matter 
whether they subverted the dominance of the classical political economy, their efforts 
shook it and developed the utility theory of value. 
Surely, if labour has value and is exchangeable, it is because it is both useful and 
limited in quantity, that is to say because it is scarce. Value, thus, comes from 
scarcity. Things other than labour, provided they are scarce, have value and are 
exchangeable just like labour itself. So the theory which traces the origin of value 
to labour is a theory that is devoid of meaning rather than too narrow, an assertion 
that is gratuitous rather than inacceptable. (Walras, 2007, p. 202) 
  
Walras thought that labor was part of scarcity, because scarcity was also the subjective 
evaluation of the available resources. But he did not explicitly discussed labor, so 
Walras’s argument would certainly ruffle those who accepted labor as the objective value 
determinant. 
                                                 
20 Stigler suspected that Jevons’s fundamental equation for the maximization of utility in exchanges, which was 
presented as 
2
1
2
1
p
p
MU
MU  , could be satisfied only for fixed prices, not for competitive markets (Stigler, p. 1950, p. 318). 
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Menger critiqued the labor theory of value even more harshly than Walras 
(Howey, 1989, p. 58): 
Among the most egregious of the fundamental errors that have had the most far-
reaching consequences in the previous development of our science is the 
argument that goods attain value for us because goods were employed in their 
production that had value to us... Here I want to state, above all, that this 
argument is so strictly opposed to all experience (p. 14621) that it would have to 
be rejected even if it provided a formally correct solution to the problem of 
establishing a principle explaining the value of goods. (Menger, 2003, p. 149) 
  
Menger thought that labor was just a specific cause for production, unlike satisfaction, 
which was the essential determinant of economic value and both consumption and 
production. 
Because Jevons was from England, where the labor theory of value was most 
developed, Jevons risked more by rejecting the labor theory of value than Menger or 
Walras (Howey, 1989, pp. 58–59).  
Labour affects supply, and supply affects the degree of utility, which governs 
value, or the ratio of exchange... I hold labour to be essentially variable, so that its 
value must be determined by the value of the produce, not the value of the 
produce by that of the labour. (Jevons, 2012, pp. 160–161)  
 
Jevons thought that labor was a factor that influenced utility just from the supply side, but 
he still applied the traditional framework of labor, rent, and capital to analyze production. 
He might have used this approach because he was in England, so he might have felt he 
needed to reconcile his utility theory with the prevailing theory at the time (Howey, 1989, 
p. 59). Nonetheless, he had a few firmer arguments to reject the labor theory of value, 
before conciliatorily explaining the relationship between labor and utility.  
                                                 
21 Menger mainly talked about the subjective nature and measure of value, and then the importance of satisfaction on 
this page. 
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The fact is, that labour once spent has no influence on the future value of any 
article: it is gone and lost for ever. In commerce, bygones are for ever bygones; 
and we are always starting clear at each moment, judging the values of things 
with a view to future utility. Industry is essentially prospective, not retrospective; 
and seldom does the result of any undertaking exactly coincide with the first 
intentions of its founders. (Jevons, 2012, p. 159)  
 
By repudiating the labor theory, Jevons further rejected the classical theory of production 
and reproduction. His prospective views might partly reflect his marginalism (focusing 
on the change) and the limitation of static analysis (considering just the single production 
process). 
3.12. More Applications 
As for the application utility theory, Jevons gave only one application, which was 
a demonstration that “both parties to an exchange gain satisfaction” (Stigler, 1950, p. 
320). 
Menger made utility theory the basis of his economic theory. “It explained 
exchange, the wages of textile workers during the Civil War cotton shortage, the shifts of 
goods between free and economic, etc… The theory of production became simply an 
instance of the theory of marginal utility…” (Stigler, 1950, p. 320). 
Walras applied utility theory in the several aspects, including the value of 
productive services determined by the values of products, demand-curve analysis, the 
distribution of stocks, and welfare economics (Stigler, 1950, p. 320–322). 
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Chapter Four: Discussion 
A revolution means “a sudden, radical, or complete change” (Merriam Webster 
Online). In the history of economics, for example, there are two revolutionary works 
universally acknowledged by economists. One is Adam Smith’s An inquiry into the 
nature and causes of the wealth of nations in 1776 and the other is John Maynard 
Keynes’s The general theory of employment, interest and money in 1936. The former, 
together with Steuart in 1767, was the fundament of classical economics and made 
political economy an independent subject, and the latter challenged both classical and 
neoclassical economics the most and was regarded as a start of modern economics. 
Alfred Marshall’s Principles of economics in 1890, which brought the ideas of marginal 
utility and cost of production into a coherent whole, might also be considered 
revolutionary. 
The “Marginal Revolution” usually refers to “the nearly simultaneous but 
completely independent discovery in the early 1870’s by Jevons, Menger and Walras of 
the principle of diminishing marginal utility as the fundamental building block of a new 
kind of static microeconomics” (Blaug, 1972, p. 269). Hence, compared with Smith, 
Keynes and Marshall, can the works of Jevons, Menger and Walras in the 1870s be also 
seen as revolutionary? 
 57 
4.1. Period 
The first part of the meaning of a revolution is its taking place in a relatively short 
period of time. To clarify the period of the “Marginal Revolution,” I divide it into three 
stages. The first stage is the preliminary introduction of the idea of utility, including its 
definition and studying method. In spite of some early writers, such as Galiani and Turgot, 
who had some disputable ideas of utility and usefulness, among the many people who 
held the explicit opinions of utility, Daniel Bernoulli and Jeremy Bentham’s innovation 
are representative of the first stage. Bernoulli was the first writer to unambiguously 
publish a statement of the law of diminishing marginal utility, also introducing the 
application of advanced mathematics into economic problems, and Bentham presented 
his utilitarianism and felicific calculus in social theory, suggesting that utility as a 
subjective factor can be used to quantitatively judge the tendency of an action and then 
the economic value. The second stage is the first presentation of the marginal utility 
theory. Jules Dupuit applied the marginal utility theory to a real problem of determining 
bridge tolls, and Hermann Heinrich Gossen explicitly presented marginal utility theory 
and its implication for individual behaviors in a market economy. William Forster 
Lloyd’s A lecture on the nature of value in 1833 also explicitly included the marginal 
utility theory but failed to elaborate its implications (Seligman, 1903, pp. 335–363). 
Nassau William Senior’s An outline of the science of political economy in 1836 said that 
the final degree of utility was the “ultimate determinant of demand” but also did not 
pursue its implications (White, 1992), and William Stanley Jevons, in his On the study of 
periodic commercial fluctuations in 1862, claimed that utility was subjective and value 
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was determined by marginal utility as well. These works laid a solid foundation for the 
third stage, the peak of the “Marginal Revolution.” The third stage is the mature and 
complete presentation of marginal utility theory in the 1870s, which is usually known as 
the “Marginal Revolution”. Jevons, Menger and Walras independently explicitly 
introduced the law of marginal utility, explained that marginal utility determined value, 
and presented other related implications and applications to economics, challenging the 
dominance of the classical political economy at the time. 
However, the process of this challenge needed a period to be recognized and 
verified, and their theories based on utility-determined value still needed further 
development, so the works of Jevons, Menger and Walras were not widely accepted into 
mainstream economics in the late nineteenth century. After the “Marginal Revolution,” 
several writers reintroduced, completed, proved, and further applied marginal utility 
theory. For example, Böhm-Bawerk’s The positive theory of capital in 1888 and Wieser’s 
Natural value in 1889 introduced marginal utility to the theory of capital and the theory 
of distribution; Marshall’s Principles of economics in 1890 synthesized the theory of 
utility and the theory of cost of production into an independent system, marking the birth 
of neoclassical economics; Clark’s The distribution of wealth in 1899 put forward a 
complete theory of marginal productivity; Pareto’s Manual of political economy in 1906 
presented the theory of cardinal utility and verified Walras’s general equilibrium; Pigou’s 
The economics of welfare in 1920 applied the marginal utility theory to formulate 
neoclassical welfare economics; moreover, Hicks’s Value and capital in 1939 applied 
indifference curves and rigorously developed Walrasian equilibrium into the general 
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equilibrium in stability conditions; then, through Samuelson’s Foundations of economic 
analysis in 1947, neoclassical economics developed into the modern form (Kan, 2008, p. 
79). 
In terms of time, the “Marginal Revolution” was a process, not an event (Blaug, 
1972, p. 280). Before the “Marginal Revolution,” the development of subjective utility 
valuation and application of advanced quantitative methods had experienced a long 
period of more than one hundred years, since Bernoulli and Bentham, not only a short 
period in the 1870s. Even though the works of the earlier writers before the 1870s were 
not as decisive as the works of Jevons, Menger and Walras, their efforts were relatively 
original and laid the foundation of the “Marginal Revolution”; Jevons, Menger and 
Walras mainly made utility theory a relatively complete system. So the works of Jevons, 
Menger and Walras in the 1870s should not be seen as a revolution on their own. 
The coincidence that the three pioneer economists published their works about the 
same topic at the same time probably determined that the 1870s were remarkable, but we 
should consider the long disputes about utility and value that proceeded them, as well as 
their predecessors, who laid the foundation for the maturity of marginal utility theory. 
Also, the “Marginal Revolution” occurred in the late nineteenth century, when natural 
sciences were significantly developed and started to influence people’s life and other 
subjects, and Jevons, Menger and Walras’s work was consistent with this trend. All in all, 
the coincidence of the three works published at the same time and the influence of natural 
sciences in the late nineteenth century seemingly made the “Marginal Revolution” 
remarkable, but in fact the revolution had been brewing for a long time. 
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4.2. Change 
The second part of the meaning of a revolution is a fundamental change. In order 
to recognize the change of the “Marginal Revolution,” we ought to consider what 
significance it had and how it influenced the history of economics. 
4.2.1. General Discussion on the Utility Theory of Jevons, Menger and Walras 
By examining the works of Jevons, Menger and Walras, we see several features 
of their utility theory. First, utility or marginal utility was the only determinant to 
economic value, and they repudiated the cost of production theory and the labor theory of 
value. This feature made their economic theory partial to the discussion of demand and 
consumption and use utility to explain the theory of supply and production. Though all 
three of the economists recognized the side of supply and production, with the 
introduction of indirect utility, they still thought that utility determined both sides, 
refusing to accept production cost as the direct determinant of supply and production. 
Considering the time during which the three economists were writing, when the 
production theory of value of the classical political economy prevailed, it might be 
reasonable that three economists repudiated the mainstream theory intensively, to 
establish a new theory of value. About twenty years later, Alfred Marshall tried to 
synthesize both the marginal utility theory from marginalism and the cost of production 
theory from classical economics into a coherent whole. With utility (or marginal utility) 
as the determinant of the demand side, and cost (or marginal cost) as the determinant of 
the supply side, the equilibrium of the two sides determined the economic value, which 
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became the fundamental economic evaluation of neoclassical economics.22 At this point, 
though the Marginal Utility School significantly pushed the development of the theory of 
utility, demand, and consumption, their less emphasizing on the theory of cost, supply 
and production made their theory hard to be considered as the start of neoclassical 
economics. 
Second, utility, from Bentham to the Marginal Utility School, had two 
representative features, different from the term usefulness in classical economics. Utility 
was not an intrinsic property of a good; it was the judgment of an individual to tell the 
importance of a good for him or her. Hence, utility was highly subjective. Also, because 
utility was related to the importance of a good to an individual, such importance could 
become homogenous and be quantitatively considered. Thus, utility had two features, 
subjectivity and identity. Then the features were also applicable to utility in neoclassical 
economics. However, these two features brought a contraction while utility was studied. 
On the one hand, utility was a homogenous quantity; with the application of 
mathematical methods, utility and its subsequent economic value could be easily 
recognized and proved, at least on the theoretical level. On the other hand, as the Jevons, 
Menger and Walras encountered, unlike cost of production, there were not effective ways 
to measure and interpersonally compare utility. Hence, utility, as economic valuation 
remaining the foundation of marginalism and neoclassical economics, seemed to lack a 
basis in the real world, unless the problem of its measurement and interpersonal 
comparison could be solved. 
                                                 
22 Marshall expected to synthesize the theory of utility and cost of production, but his synthesis laid the emphasis on 
utility theory. After Marshall, Clark and his marginal productivity was the key for neoclassical production theory. 
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Third, the methods that the three economists applied in their works also had some 
similar features. Because utility was the only determinant in their economic theory and 
utility was homogenous, their analysis, especially that of Jevons and Walras, widely 
applied quantitative methods. The application of equations and graphs made their 
arguments straightforward and rigorous, but they more or less ignored qualitative analysis. 
Due to this transformation, economics tended to be a science. However, an essential goal 
of economics, which was studying the relationship between humans and resources, 
remained unchanged. Economists began to dispute which approach was good for 
economic study and how each approach defined the implication of economics. Hence, in 
the late nineteenth century, not only did natural sciences begin to have a significant 
influence on economics, but several schools also challenged the dominance of the 
classical political economy, making economics a lively subject in this period. Moreover, 
when talking about the approach of marginalism, the application of the marginal amount 
seemed to be the only incontrovertible contribution of the Marginal Utility School to 
economics. With the development of advanced mathematics and its introduction by 
Bernoulli and other writers to social theory, the marginal amount, like the total or average 
amount, had become important to economic analysis. Based on the differential, marginal 
amount represented the change of a quantity, which could be applied for explicit 
prediction in the adjacent future with the empirical data and theoretical assumption. 
Fourth, there were some possible deficiencies, at least regarding utility theory, in 
the Marginal Utility School. Except for the representative features discussed above, there 
were also some disputable points in the works of Jevons, Menger and Walras. For 
 63 
example, the three economists believed that the measurement of utility was cardinal and 
assume static situations, excluding time and other factors.23 Not only introducing the 
marginal amount, the three economists elaborated upon marginal utility theory, such as 
the exchange theory and the utility function, and they formed a relatively complete theory 
of demand and consumption, which was later succeeded by neoclassical economists, but 
their analysis on the side of production and supply seemed less and needed amending. 
Hence, although the “Marginal Revolution” created a relatively complete theory 
of utility, demand, consumption, and marginal analysis, the significance of the “Marginal 
Revolution” should be reconsidered. 
4.2.2. Two Central Topics 
Because the subjective utility theory of value and marginal analysis were the 
major achievements of the “Marginal Revolution,” it is necessary to discuss more about 
these two central topics. 
From a philosophical perspective, value is neither a connection inside an object 
nor a connection among objects, but a connection between subjects and objects (Zhang, 
2001, p. 24). Value includes moral value, political value, economic value and so on; we 
consider only economic value here. Because value connects both subjects and objects, it 
must have both subjective and objective features. The two prevailing theories of 
economic value in the nineteenth century, the labor theory of value and the utility theory 
of value, also had these two features. However, because labor was the measurement of 
cost of production that had more objective features, and utility was the measurement of 
                                                 
23 Because this thesis does not cover the development of utility theory after Jevons, Menger and Walras, the correctness 
of this theory cannot be evaluated in this thesis, from a modern perspective. 
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individual preference that had more subjective features, usually the labor theory of value 
was considered objective and the utility theory of value was considered subjective. Hence, 
the subjective utility theory of value was not subjectively arbitrary or non-related to the 
objective. Utility, the measure of preference, was related to the objective world but varied 
across individuals, time, and environment. As for labor, the utility theory of value of the 
Marginal Utility School thought that labor was actually disutility that generated pain and 
was one of the factors that determined the supply side, so utility was the essential 
determinant of economic value. Both the theories of value became fundamental parts of 
the economic theory for the different schools, and they each repudiated the other. Here, 
we only continue discussing the utility theory of value. Relatively, utility theory of value 
emphasized the subjective aspect of value. Because a subject could be an individual, a 
society, or the entire human world, compared with labor or cost of production, which 
focused on the objective aspect of value, studying subjects was relatively directly 
observed and easily understood24, probably because we were the subjects. If preference 
was assumed to be continuous, it could be described by real numbers. Though individual 
wants were insatiable, under certain constraints, individuals tried to satisfy their 
preferences. Based on this principle, all microeconomic principles and functions, from 
the individual level to the market, could be derived, which provided the effective way to 
quantitatively think about microeconomic problems. Since this thesis is only about the 
utility theory of value, more discussion on the cost theory of value is needed, before 
comparing the two value theories. However, both the two value theories must have 
                                                 
24 However, this easiness probably needs at least one of the two prerequisites. One is that economists find effective 
ways to measure utility, and the other is that economists establish cogent assumptions based on their empirical 
observation. 
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cogent and weak aspects, and with the development of economics, economists supporting 
either one of the two theories could renovate their theory and synthesize the advisable 
part of the other value theory. Alternatively, economists could discover a new theory of 
value to better balance subjects and objects, to focus on universality or difference, and to 
choose the ways to understand the world directly and easily or accurately and deeply. 
As for marginal analysis, it studied the change of the dependent variable with one 
additional unit of the independent variable. Marginal thought could be accurately 
described by partial derivative in calculus in mathematics, so the two pioneers, Jevons 
and Walras spoke highly of the application of advanced mathematics and introduced it to 
social and economic analysis to interpret their marginal thought. Also, continuum was a 
property of calculus, so the quantitative analysis in Jevons and Walras needed the 
assumption of continuity for their economic quantities to apply calculus, which had been 
discussed in Part 3.4. However, marginal thought did not rely solely on the application of 
calculus. Though calculus was an effective tool, all of the three pioneers also described 
the diminishing law of marginal utility in their words, seen in Part 3.1, and one of them, 
Menger, did not use calculus but arithmetic tables to further interpret the law, without the 
assumption of continuity and divisibility. In all, among the three pioneers, Jevons and 
Walras adopted the continuous variation to interpret their marginal thought and apply it 
in their marginal analysis, and Menger did the same thing without the continuous 
variation. Hence, marginal analysis or marginal thought should be the other central topic 
for the marginal utility theory and the Marginal Utility School, instead of the continuous 
variation, which was probably a key for neoclassical economics. The marginal amount, 
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either continuous or discontinuous, appeared while the traditional quantitative analysis 
mainly chose the total and average amount to describe and calculate the data, widely 
adopted by classical economics before the Marginal Utility School. The total and average 
amount focused on the past facts or historical data to summarize the law of several 
phenomena and estimate the future tendency. However, the marginal amount, like 
differentials in calculus, was used to study the local change of a quantity. Hence, in 
economics, marginal analysis could use the adjacently past facts to more explicitly 
explain the current situation, not relying on the large amount of the past data. Therefore, 
unlike the total and average amounts, which could be broadly used to analyze the laws 
and trends of social phenomena, marginal analysis could be more concrete and immediate 
for a limited period of time, and usually accepted by the individual and enterprise level. 
However, since the marginal amount studied the next additional change and relied on the 
adjacent data, simply using it, economic analysis would prefer the shorter term and even 
the static situation, which was different from the prevailing dynamic analysis of 
production and reproduction in classical political economy. This probably was the main 
reason that the static situation was assumed by the three pioneers in their utility function 
and they excluded time. In all, the adoption of marginal thought brought another way for 
economists to consider the current and static situation with a more exact method and an 
explicit perspective, especially suited for the development of microeconomics. 
4.2.3. Shifting 
The standard history usually contains the comment that the advent of the Marginal 
Utility School marked the beginning of modern economics, in that it shifted the 
attention of economists from cost, or more specifically labor cost, to marginal 
utility in the explanation of value, and from nature to men in the wider picture. It 
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dates the beginning of ‘subjective’ or ‘psychological’ economics from this time. 
(Howey, 1989, p. 210)  
 
To sum up, the central concept of the “Marginal Revolution,” marginal utility, is 
important to the history of economics in the following respects. First, change from 
objectivity to subjectivity. The valuation of economic value is always a fundamental 
topic in economics. Utility, as an extrinsic property of goods with individuals’ different 
and unstable judgments, was used for evaluation, giving economic value more subjective 
features. Second, change from the side of cost and production to the side of utility and 
consumption. Because marginal utility was regarded as the major determinant of 
economic value and it was more related to individuals’ consumption, its introduction 
made economics switch its attention from the supply side to the demand side. Third, 
change from qualitative analysis to quantitative analysis. Different from use-value, to 
better and more easily know the usefulness of goods, utility was created as a convenient 
way to quantitatively measure the importance of a good for an individual and the 
tendency of individual behaviors. Utility does not consider the specific usefulness of 
goods, but one quantity abstracted from usefulness. Fourth, change from the total or 
average amount to the marginal amount. The marginal analysis was a tool to directly and 
explicitly study the economic value in a limited period of time, which was widely 
accepted by later economists. Also, to better use the marginal amount, economists 
applied advanced mathematical tools like calculus for more exact analysis, giving 
economic value the continuous and divisible feature. Fifth, change with more influence 
from the natural sciences. With the development of the natural sciences, the application 
of mathematics, psychology, and other fields gave economics more scientific features and 
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speeded up the professionalization of economic science. Also, interdisciplinary studies 
between economics and other fields, and more related topics involved, such as health, 
environment, and technology, helped people understand the world more widely and let 
economic theory play a more lively role for society.25 Sixth, change with more 
assumptions. Because economists at the time of Jevons, Menger and Walras could not 
find a way to measure utility, the employment of utility needed to be abstracted from 
reality, with a series of assumptions, such as the static situation, the continuous variation 
and the cardinal measurement. Seventh, change with some new schools emerging. The 
rise of the Marginal Utility School and the introduction of marginal utility theory shook 
the dominance of classical economics. After the three pioneers, the Marginal Utility 
School influenced the foundation of several schools of economics, including the 
Lausanne School and Austrian School, and then Marshall. These transformations, no 
matter whether they were good or bad, brought new angles, new methods, and new 
implications to economics, expanding the possibilities for economic study. 
Though writers before Jevons, Menger and Walras had recognized subjective 
valuation, applied the quantitative method, and introduced the thought of diminishing 
marginal utility, unlike the three pioneers they failed to develop the law into a complete 
system and extend its implications and applications. So, the works of Jevons, Menger and 
Walras should be considered as the peak of the “Marginal Revolution”. After the peak, 
economists adopted and developed the methods of marginal analysis, time analysis, 
general equilibrium, and applied advanced mathematics. Starting in the 1870s, the objects 
                                                 
25 However, at the beginning stage of the interdisciplinary study, economists might simply impose the economic theory 
on the other subjects, which probably also brought the negative effects on both economics and the other subjects. 
Hence, the interdisciplinary study needs more consideration and further development. 
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of economic study gradually switched from cost and production, the classical 
perspectives, to utility and consumption, and then both were integrated into the 
neoclassical perspectives. At this point, economic thinking and economic methods were 
indeed significantly changed through the “Marginal Revolution.” 
4.2.4. The Beginning of Neoclassical Economics? 
Generally, neoclassical economics thought that economic value was determined 
by the equilibrium of demand and supply, while demand was determined by marginal 
utility and supply was determined by marginal cost of production. Alfred Marshall’s 
Principles in 1890, influenced by both the classical economists, such as Ricardo and J. S. 
Mill, and the marginalists, such as Jevons, Menger and Walras, tried to bring the two 
relatively conflicting economic streams of thought into a coherent whole, thereby 
marking the birth of neoclassical economics.26 
Marshall supported neither Ricardo nor Jevons but attempted to reconcile the two 
writers (Howey, 1989, p. 78):  
It is then incorrect to say, as Ricardo did, that Cost of production alone determines 
value: but it is no less incorrect to make utility alone, as others have done, the 
basis of value. It is certainly true that utility is a condition of value always; and 
that in cases in which the supply of the commodity is fixed, utility determines 
price. It is true that the price of every commodity must be measure of its Final 
utility; that is of its value in use to those who are only just induced to purchase it. 
But it is not true that this Final utility determines value: for it changes itself, 
according to the Law of Demand, with every change in the amount of the 
commodity that is offered for sale. This amount, and therefore the Final utility of 
the commodity, depend upon the relation between the circumstances of supply 
and those of demand. (Marshall & Marshall, 1885, p. 148) 
  
                                                 
26 However, this thesis does not focus on Marshall. Whether Marshall succeeded in synthesizing the theories of the two 
schools, and which theory he was partial to, needs more discussion. Here, I assume that he did it but sort of emphasized 
on the marginalism, so the neoclassical economics and the Marginal Utility School had a more consistent relationship. 
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As Edmund Whittaker concluded, “just as he drew on the ideas of Jevons, so Marshall 
incorporated in his theories the doctrines of Mill on the side of production” (Whittaker, 
1942, p. 453). 
Because neoclassical economics synthesized the value theories of both of the two 
streams in the late nineteenth century, it is better to think that the start of neoclassical 
economics was Marshall’s Principles, instead of the works of the Marginal Utility School 
in the 1870s. Hence, if my assumption is correct, the “Marginal Revolution” should not 
be thought of as the beginning of neoclassical economics. 
There are some possible counterviews to this argument. The “Marginal 
Revolution” could be the start of neoclassical economics, for two possible reasons. First, 
though Marshall expected to absorb both the achievements of classical political economy 
and the Marginal Utility School, he did not succeed in synthesizing them. Though the 
economic value of neoclassical economics was apparently determined by the equilibrium 
of demand and supply, namely marginal utility and marginal cost, economic value was 
essentially subjectively determined. The production theory, based on the subjective 
theory of value and influenced by the subjective consumption theory, was also put on a 
subjective foundation. So the utility theory of value was the crucial change for 
neoclassical economics. It had been developed since Bentham’s time, before Marshall 
and the Marginal Utility School. Also, supply depended on “discommodities” and 
production cost in Marshall’s system was actually disutility, which was still part of utility 
theory, similar to the three pioneers who thought labor was an indirect factor to generate 
pain (negative utility) when they repudiated the labor theory of value. Hence, Marshall 
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failed to bring the two streams into a coherent whole but mainly developed the utility 
theory of marginalists in the 1870s, so my assumption that he succeeded in synthesizing 
the two streams was not correct. Second, in the late nineteenth century, new methods like 
marginal analysis, time analysis, general equilibrium, and applied advanced mathematics 
established by the Marginal Utility School were directly passed to Marshall and then to 
neoclassical economists. The similar analytical approaches might make people think that 
Marshall was one of the direct successors of the “Marginal Revolution.” These may be 
two of the opposing views to the opinion that Marshall, with his Principles of economics 
in 1890, was the beginning of neoclassical economics. 
In all, since this thesis is mainly about the “Marginal Revolution” and the 
marginal utility theory before and in the 1870s, more examination on the work of 
Marshall and the later neoclassical economists is needed before the discussion on which 
event could be considered as the beginning of neoclassical economics. However, there 
are two vague differences between the utility theory in the 1870s and after Marshall. The 
first is the continuous variation. Part 3.4 and Part 4.2.2 present that though the 
assumption of continuous variation and the application of calculus could be an effective 
way to describe the thought of marginal utility, in the process of the “Marginal 
Revolution”, representatives like Galiani, Bentham, Lloyd and Menger did not adhere to 
the assumption of continuous variation, different from writers such as Bernoulli, Jevons 
and Walras. Though the successors of the Marginal Utility School started to widely adopt 
continuous variation as an important assumption, especially by neoclassical economists, 
continuous variation was not a central concept for the “Marginal Revolution” and the 
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marginal utility theory before and in the 1870s. The second is the acceptance of the 
classical economic theory. Part 3.11 shows the intensive repudiation of the labor theory 
of value of the three pioneers and they only used marginal utility to interpret both the 
sides of demand and supply. After them, several concepts like marginal cost and marginal 
productivity were adopted to more explicitly interpret the theory of production, and 
Marshall tried to synthesize both the ideas of the classical economists, such as Ricardo 
and Mill, and the Marginal Utility School. The attitudes towards the classical economics 
and its cost theory of value were shifted to some degrees, from the Marginal Utility 
School to the later neoclassical economists. 
4.2.5. Before and After 
One way to think about whether an event or work is revolutionary is to consider 
what it destroys and what it initiates. The works of Jevons, Menger and Walras did not 
succeed in replacing the classical political economy at their time, probably because the 
dominance of classical economics at their time was still strong or their theory had some 
deficiencies and incompleteness which needed their successors to amend it. After the 
three pioneers, the emergence of the theory of equilibrium essentially shocked the 
dominance of classical economics could be considered as the start of neoclassical 
economics. Also, although several schools emerged after the “Marginal Revolution,” they 
were relatively immature, and the influence of these schools was not as significant as 
mainstream economics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In other words, 
these schools could be generally attributed to the wide category of classical economics, 
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neoclassical economics, or neither. Hence, at this point, the influence of “Marginal 
Revolution” was not quite significant.
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Chapter Five: Summary 
5.1. Conclusion 
Therefore, combining the two arguments above, and compared with the three 
representative revolutionary events (the formulations of the classical political economy, 
neoclassical economics, and Keynesian economics), the “Marginal Revolution” was less 
revolutionary in the history of economics than most people usually think. 
First, in terms of the time, the “Marginal Revolution” experienced a relatively 
long period of formulation, beginning in the eighteenth century. The development of 
marginal utility theory was a long process, beginning before the 1870s by many writers, 
such as Bernoulli and Bentham in the first stage, Dupuit and Gossen in the second stage, 
and Jevons, Menger and Walras in the final stage. Second, in terms of influence, even 
though many new thoughts and analytical methods were added in economic study, the 
Marginal Utility School focused on its own discovery and avoided some advisable 
theories from classical political economy, making its theory with some disputable 
incompleteness. Compared with other representative revolutionary works, such as 
Marshall’s Principles, the significance of the “Marginal Revolution” seemed less 
remarkable. Thus, in terms of the development of the marginal utility theory before and 
in the 1870s, the history of economic thought tends not to consider the “Marginal 
Revolution” a revolution. 
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5.2. Expectation 
The period of the “Marginal Revolution” has ended in the history of economic 
thought, but its influence is still playing an important role in modern economic study. 
Some disputes, such as what economics should be; what range it can cover; how many 
kinds of methods we can use for economic study; how to deal with the relationship 
among thought and tools, assumptions and reality, and quantitative analysis and 
qualitative analysis; whether the classic laws and assumptions still have deficiencies; 
whether we can discover a better way to define economic value; and so on are still topics 
worthy of reconsideration. This thesis expects economists to explore these topics in the 
future.
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